ALERRT

Active Shooter Response Level 1

Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALERRT Texas State University

Version 8.0

For more information on the ALERRT program, please visit our website at www.ALERRT.org

Active Shooter Response Level 1 Course

Version 8.0

A collaborative effort.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Partner Engagement
Violence Reduction Unit
Active Shooter Initiative

ALERRT at Texas State University
a Member of the Texas State University System
in partnership with
San Marcos, Texas, Police Department
Hays County, Texas, Sheriff's Office

Following the tragic 2012 active shooter attack at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, CT, the President of the United States committed Executive Office resources to protect children and communities by reducing gun violence. He assigned the Vice President to lead the effort with focus on schools, institutions of higher education and houses of worship.

The FBI, as part of the task force, was assigned to lead the effort to promote coordinated Active Shooter training among law enforcement agencies nationwide. The FBI's Office of Partner Engagement established the Active Shooter Initiative and partnered with ALERRT in order to accomplish this mission.

ALERRT Mission Statement

"To provide the best research-based active shooter response training in the nation."

ALERRT Vision Statement

"Training and research that saves lives and protects communities."

ALERRT
TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Copyright Information

Active Shooter Response – Level 1 Course

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Texas State University is part of the Texas State University System.

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1015–1115	Module 4	Approaching and Entering the Attack Site
1115–1200	Module 5	Interior Movement – 1-4 Person Exigent
1200–1300	Lunch	
1300–1310	Searches	Down Weapons / Searches
1310–1400	Module 5	Set Up for Room Entry – 2-4 Person Deliberate
1400–1500	Module 6	Medical
1500–1600	Module 7	SIM (Security, Incident Command, Medical)
1600–1645	Module 8	Improvised Explosive Devices
1645–1700		Wrap-Up and Instructions for Day 2
Day 2		
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0830–1200	Module 9	Force-on-Force Scenarios
1200–1300	Lunch	
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1630–1700	Module 12	Wrap-Up, Post-Test, Evaluation

***NOTE**: This course is designed to be presented over two consecutive days. Starting and ending times for instruction each day may be adjusted to accommodate local requirements for the practical exercise training location.*

Module 1: Course Introduction and Administration



Slide 1-1: Course Title Page

Duration	15 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, participants will receive an overview of the ALERRT Active Shooter Level 1 course. The module will cover the two-day course schedule, along with all administrative requirements including registration, waivers, and training rosters. The module also includes a pretest to assess participants' base knowledge of course materials.
Terminal Learning Objective	Participants will recognize the course goal, enabling objectives, course schedule, and course performance requirements.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 1.1 State the goal and summarize the objectives for the course 1.2 Recognize that multiple agencies and levels of experience are present within the class 1.3 Be familiar with the course schedule and administrative requirements 1.4 Complete a brief pre-test 1.5 Recognize that their comprehension of critical elements of the course will be assessed through a post-test, teaching skills assessment, and observation of the student's ability to safely and effectively lead a force-on-force training scenario

Resources	● Instructor Guide ● Module 1 presentation slides ● Audiovisual kit ● Projection screen ● Attendance sheets ● One per participant of the following items: ○ Participant Guide ○ Pen
Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size
Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	Not applicable
Assessment Strategy	● Observing participant behavior in the classroom ● Administering a pre-test to assess participants' base knowledge of course materials ● Questioning participants to ensure that they understand how their performance will be evaluated

Slide 1-2: Module 1 Course Introduction and Administration

Welcome

Slide 1-3: Welcome



Slide 1-4: Safety Brief

Testing

In order to pass the course, participants must complete the post-test and achieve a score of 80% or higher. The test assesses how well participants have mastered the learning objectives. Instructors may administer retests onsite, if needed.



Slide 1-5: Introductions



Slide 1-6: Course Goal

ALERRT Level 1 Course Goal

The goal of the course is to provide law enforcement professionals nationwide with a simple, standard set of skills enabling them to save as many lives as possible when responding to an active shooter incident, either alone or as part of a small ad hoc team.



Slide 1-7: Course Overview



Slide 1-8: Course Overview (Continued)

ALERRT Level 1 Course Overview

Terms and Definitions

The FBI defines an *active shooter* as "an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area." Based on this definition, the term active shooter will be used throughout this course to refer to any ongoing attack on multiple individuals, regardless of the type of weapon used. The terms *LE responder(s)* or *responder(s*) will be used interchangeably throughout the manual to include all local, state, and federal law enforcement professionals who are armed and have sworn to protect the lives of innocent civilians.

Tactical Advantage

Active shooters have the advantage of choosing the time and location of their attack, which enables them to plan and prepare ahead of time. They also often have the advantage of being on the defensive rather than the offensive when the first LE responders arrive. In addition, attackers may

have the advantage of superior firepower—they may be using high-powered weapons and explosive devices against LE responders who may initially only be armed with pistols.

In contrast, LE responders arriving at an active shooter attack will be going into an unfamiliar location to conduct a hostage rescue mission either alone, or with a small ad hoc team of individuals they may have never trained with before, against a well-armed, highly motivated attacker. Under these circumstances, the only way to swing the tactical advantage back in favor of the LE responder is through effective teamwork and tactics.

Techniques

It is not the goal of ALERRT to provide SWAT training or to convince LE responders that the tactics they learned on their SWAT team or within their department are inferior to those taught in ALERRT Level 1. Instead of comparing the pros and cons of the myriad of different tactics currently being used in the law enforcement and military communities, the goal of this course is to provide basic, tactically-sound, standardized active shooter response training across the country. This enables LE responders from different agencies to work together safely and effectively on active shooter responses.

The techniques taught in ALERRT Level 1 were developed by combat veterans and law enforcement tactical officers and are based on real-world deadly force encounters with well-armed, highly motivated adversaries. The lessons learned by these soldiers and officers will, if applied properly, provide a tactical advantage to LE responders, enabling them to effectively neutralize well-armed, highly motivated attackers. In addition to being extremely effective, the techniques taught in this course have intentionally been kept simple so that LE responders with limited prior tactical experience can still become proficient in them during the two-day course.

Life-Saving Care

In many active shooter attacks, there are critically injured victims whose lives can only be saved if they receive immediate medical care and rapid transport to a trauma center. In ALERRT Level 1, LE responders will gain the skills needed to provide immediate life-saving care inside the attack site. They can then quickly and safely move critically injured victims to a location where EMS personnel can provide advanced medical care and transportation to a trauma center without delay.

Module 2: Law Enforcement Response to Active Shooter Incidents

Slide 2-1: Law Enforcement Response to Active Shooter Incidents

Duration	45 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, participants will be made aware of the vital lessons learned from previous active shooter incidents that have directly influenced the techniques taught in ALERRT Level 1. Also, participants will learn to distinguish between a hostage/barricade and an active shooter situation and how to respond appropriately to each situation to save as many lives as possible. The core concepts, principles, and equipment necessary to effectively respond to an active shooter incident will be covered. Principles for safely handling weapons during training and real-world responses will also be discussed.
Terminal Learning Objective	Participants will acquire an understanding of the concepts and principles related to active shooter response, which they will be required to apply during the hands-on instruction and practical scenario portions of the course.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 2.1 Recognize how lessons learned from previous active shooter incidents have shaped this course 2.2 Identify the difference between a hostage/barricade and an active shooter situation and respond accordingly 2.3 Be familiar with the core concepts and principles that enable an effective active shooter response 2.4 Recognize the time-sensitive tasks that must be accomplished by initial incident command 2.5 List the critical items needed in a go bag 2.6 Demonstrate safe weapon-handling skills

Resources	● Instructor Guide ● Module 2 presentation slides ● Audiovisual kit ● Projection screen ● Glock training pistol (cleared, unloaded, no magazine) ● One per participant of the following items: ○ Participant Guide ○ Pen
Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size
Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	Not applicable
Assessment Strategy	● Observing participant behavior in the classroom ● Questioning participants to ensure comprehension of module objectives

Slide 2-2: Lessons Learned from the Past

2.1 Lessons Learned from Active Shooter Incidents

ALERRT and the FBI carefully study domestic and foreign active shooter incidents as they occur to incorporate the lessons learned from each attack into the Level 1 course. Some of the notable lessons learned from these attacks, which led to significant changes in how law enforcement officers are trained and equipped to handle active shooter incidents, are listed below.



Slide 2-3: Columbine High School

A New Priority of Life Scale

On April 20, 1999, two students at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado attacked their classmates using high-powered weapons and explosive devices, eventually killing 13 and injuring 24 people. The first responding officers arrived within a few minutes of the initial shots. They followed their training and protocol by establishing a perimeter and calling for SWAT.

For several minutes after officers arrived outside, the attackers roamed unopposed through the school, shooting victims at will. Approximately 13 minutes after the attack started, the attackers

shot themselves. This ended the attack but left numerous injured victims in critical need of medical care inside the school with no emergency responders to help them. It wasn't until 45 minutes after the attack started that the first SWAT officers entered the school. It took hours for the school to be declared safe enough to allow medical personnel to enter and reach the victims.



Slide 2-4: Lessons Learned from Columbine High School



Slide 2-5: Priority of Life Scale

Even before the attack at Columbine had ended, law enforcement agencies across the country realized that something needed to change. While protecting the lives of officers remained a high priority, stopping the killing of innocent civilians took first priority. From that moment forward, every law enforcement officer was expected to be willing to risk his or her life without hesitation. Law enforcement officers were expected to distract, isolate, and neutralize the threat, even in tactically complex situations and when they lacked special tactical training. Following Columbine, many state and federal law enforcement agencies began implementing active shooter training for

all officers, regardless of their specialty, in order to provide them with the knowledge and techniques necessary to successfully stop well-armed, highly motivated attackers.

Slide 2-6: Virginia Tech

Saving Lives Through Tactically-Sound Guidance for Civilians

On April 16, 2007, a Virginia Tech student murdered two individuals in a campus dormitory. He then went to a classroom building, chained the doors shut, and started killing students and professors. The attacker moved back and forth between five different classrooms on the second floor of the building. In some rooms, the occupants were able to keep the attacker out or slow him down by blocking the door with their bodies, allowing others to escape out the window. The attacker entered other rooms without any obstruction and systematically shot the occupants at close range. After killing 32 individuals and wounding 17 others in 11 minutes, the attacker killed himself when he heard officers breaching the exterior door.

The law enforcement response at Virginia Tech was fast and effective; however, this attack illustrated that a fast, effective response by law enforcement is not enough to prevent an attacker from killing numerous people. The attack at Virginia Tech highlighted the fact that the actions taken by civilians during the first few minutes of an attack (before LE responders arrive) can significantly reduce the number of fatalities.



Slide 2-7: Lessons Learned from Virginia Tech

ALERRT, the FBI, and several other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies agree that training civilians to respond quickly and effectively to an active shooter incident is critically important. For civilian training, ALERRT uses the verbiage *Avoid, Deny, Defend*, and the FBI and other federal agencies use *Run, Hide, Fight*; while the verbiage is different, the key concepts are identical. By following these models, civilians with minimal training can effectively deny an attacker the opportunity to quickly kill a large number of people before the police arrive.

- **Run/Avoid**: If it is safe to do so for yourself and those in your care, the first course of action is to quickly and cautiously evacuate in a direction away from the attacker and move to a safe location
- **Hide/Deny**: If trapped by the attacker, individuals should barricade the door and get out of sight
- **Fight/Defend:** Prepare a plan to use teamwork and ad hoc weapons to incapacitate the attacker if he or she enters the room



Slide 2-8: Effective Training for Civilians



Slide 2-9: Robb Elementary

Need for Critical Thinkers and Contingency Plans

On May 24, 2022, a lone gunman entered Robb Elementary armed with an assault rifle. He entered the school through a locked but unsecure door and gained access to rooms 111 and 112. Once in the room, he began shooting students and teachers. Having been fired upon through the door, law enforcement backed off and treated the incident as a barricaded person. It took 77 minutes for law enforcement to enter the room and end the attack. As a result, 19 elementary students and two teachers were killed.

Hours could be spent critiquing law enforcement's approach to the attack on May 24, 2022. However, it isn't ALERRT's intent to focus on the actions of any one officer or group of officers but instead recognize that this was a failure of law enforcement as a profession. By discussing what went wrong and what lessons we can learn through these events, we can gain invaluable knowledge to carry through our careers.



Slide 2-10: Lessons Learned from Robb Elementary

Slide 2-11: Active Shooter Response Operational Goals

Operational Goals

Stopping the Killing

When a gunman opened fire on a crowd of thousands at the Route 91 Music Festival in 2017, dozens of individuals in the crowd (such as off-duty military personnel, EMS personnel, and fire fighters) knew what needed to be done and immediately started helping people take cover and evacuate the wounded. However, there were only a handful of individuals in the crowd who had the training and tools necessary to stop the shooter. Those few were law enforcement officers.

Law enforcement officers are part of a small group of individuals who possess the training and tools necessary to stop the shooting. It is imperative that LE responders accept that responsibility and remain focused on this key task until it is complete. This may mean having to bypass critically wounded people while hunting for the shooter. Giving words of encouragement and dropping medical supplies as you pass by is acceptable, but stopping or slowing down to provide medical aid to the wounded will give an active shooter more time to kill and seriously injure additional people elsewhere. For example, stopping for 20 seconds to place a tourniquet may save one life; however, in those 20 seconds, the shooter can shoot 20 more victims. Also, LE responders who holster their weapon to apply a tourniquet during the attack could get ambushed or incapacitated—the attacker will remain at large to continue killing at will, and none of the injured victims will receive life-saving medical care until someone else arrives and stops the threat.

The first priority for LE responders in an active shooter incident is to *stop the killing*. This is accomplished by isolating, distracting, and neutralizing the threat. Once LE responders have accomplished their first priority, they should immediately transition to their second priority: *stop the dying*.

Stopping the Dying

Stopping the dying is accomplished by providing immediate life-saving medical care inside the attack site, then quickly creating a secure corridor, and transporting the most critically injured

individuals to a location where they can receive a higher level of medical care.

Slide 2-12: Casualty Care / Transport Models

There are four basic models of victim care and transport: *protected corridor*, *protected island*, *Rescue Task Force*, and the *Law Enforcement Rescue Model*. The focus of the ALERRT Level 1 class is the Law Enforcement Rescue Model. Law enforcement officers are the only ones who operate in any warm zones. After LE responders have stopped the active killing, they should turn their attention to stopping the dying. Law enforcement responders should provide indirect threat care to victims and transport the patients out of the warm zone. Ideally, LE responders should transport the patients to the cold zone, where waiting EMS and fire personnel will provide additional care, triage, and transport to definitive care. However, if EMS or fire resources are not available, LE responders can transport directly to definitive care. All of these models have been used to successfully provide patient care and evacuation during actual attacks. Because this is a class for law enforcement only, the manual will focus on the Law Enforcement Rescue Model. The other models are outside the scope of this class and are discussed at length in the ALERRT AAIR class.



Slide 2-13: Hostage/Barricade vs. Active Shooter

2.2 Hostage/Barricade versus Active Shooter

Incidents like the Pulse Nightclub shooting illustrate the challenge faced by LE responders in determining whether a situation calls for an active shooter style response or a traditional hostage/barricade response. Lives are on the line and will possibly be lost if responders take too long to determine which type of situation they are dealing with, or if they hastily apply the incorrect type of response.

In an active shooter situation, responders can quickly identify which type of situation they are facing by asking the following question: *Is there reliable evidence that an attacker is actively killing people? Does an attacker who has killed or injured people still have the means, motive, and opportunity to kill additional people to which he / she has access? Are his or her actions preventing medical attention from reaching critically injured victims?* If the answer is "yes," then an active shooter situation exists, and LE responders should take immediate action to stop the killing and stop the dying. Most of the ALERRT Level 1 course is focused on this type of response. If the answer to the above question is "no," then LE responders should follow their agency's standard procedures for hostage/barricade situations. This response may include issuing an updated LCAN report (location, conditions, actions, and needs) and creating an immediate action plan while waiting for additional resources.



Slide 2-14: Hostage/Barricade LCAN – Make a Plan

LCAN

If a hostage/barricade situation exists, responders should issue an updated LCAN report as soon as practical. A proper LCAN will include the condition (hostage/barricade) and needs (SWAT/negotiators).

SWAT and Negotiators

Law enforcement responders should, as soon as practical, request support from negotiators and a tactical team trained in dealing with hostage/barricade situations. Incident Commanders will

provide an in-person situation report to SWAT team leaders when they arrive. This situation report will include the same information previously provided to command.

For complex hostage situations, both state and federal tactical teams (e.g., FBI SWAT and FBI Hostage Rescue Teams) can provide significant resources and advanced capabilities to assist the efforts of local SWAT teams. These additional resources require extra time to respond; therefore, the earlier they are requested, the better.

Make a Plan

While waiting for SWAT and negotiators to arrive, the initial LE responders should develop their own immediate action plan for a hasty rescue in case the hostage-taker starts shooting hostages. The plan needs to include specific actions assigned to specific individuals and should be clearly communicated to everyone involved as well as command. Responders should consider factors such as whether the attacker is isolated or distracted and whether the injured should be treated or evacuated from the warm zone immediately.



Slide 2-15: Active Shooter Response Concepts and Principles

2.3 Active Shooter Response Concepts and Principles

Many hostage takers see value in keeping their hostages alive to be exchanged for something they desire, which gives responders time to attempt to calm the situation and call for more assistance. In contrast, active shooters place no value on human life, only on the excitement they get from taking it. Historically, active shooters have been motivated by a broad range of factors, from terrorism to revenge.

One thing that most active shooters have in common, regardless of their motivation, is that during the attack, they act as cold-blooded killers in an altered mental state. This altered mental state enables them to violently kill children and innocent victims at close range without the sense of compassion innate to most human beings. In this altered mental state, they are extremely

dangerous. They have often already accepted their own death and are intent on taking as many people with them as possible.

Law enforcement officers responding to an active shooter incident need to be well-trained and mentally prepared to encounter mentally unstable, hyper-violent attackers. While some active shooter incidents are relatively spontaneous events, others are extremely well-planned, complex attacks. For some active shooters, the attack date is the climax following weeks, months, or years of planning and preparation. This type of attacker will probably have included law enforcement response in his or her attack plan. He or she will be intimately familiar with the attack site and know how to use the environment to gain a tactical advantage over responders. Therefore, LE responders must never underestimate an active shooter's ability to use effective tactics and firepower against them.

The following concepts and principles, learned in combat and during complex law enforcement tactical operations, will swing the tactical advantage back in favor of the responding officers and enable them to neutralize even the most dangerous attackers.



Slide 2-16: Active Shooter Response Concepts and Principles

Slide 2-17: Stay Together as Much as Possible

Stay Together as Much as Possible

Active shooter situations are chaotic and filled with many urgent tasks that need to be completed. A contact team must resist the urge to divide and conquer to complete tasks. For example, if a four-person team realizes they need to investigate a suspicious person at one end of a hallway, but there is a victim who needs a tourniquet at the other end of the hallway, the team may be tempted to divide into two, two-person teams and accomplish both tasks simultaneously. However, if they do this and the attacker emerges from a room in between the two teams, no one will be able to return fire without endangering their partners. Law enforcement responders could think of their team as an armored car with four turrets providing protection in all directions, instead of four individual officers working together. In other words, the armored car can only go one place at a time, so the team must prioritize tasks and accomplish them one at a time and together as a team. After all known threats are neutralized, larger teams may break up into smaller ones to complete the numerous follow-on tasks necessary in order to stop the dying.

As LE responders aggressively maneuver to isolate, distract, or neutralize an active shooter threat, their protection comes primarily from effective return fire, not from hiding behind hard cover. This concept is referred to as the *ABCs of Cover*. Law enforcement responders' most effective protection from incoming rounds is a high volume of accurate return fire. Their next level of protection is their ballistic vest, and their final option is getting behind hard cover.

Slide 2-18: Maintain 540 Degree Security

Maintain 540-Degree Security

Law enforcement responders should attempt to gain as much information as possible about the attacker(s) before arriving at the scene; however, it is likely that initial intelligence reports will be limited and inaccurate. This lack of reliable intelligence about the number of attackers and their descriptions makes it critical for responders to always maintain a heightened awareness of their surroundings.

Most active shooter incidents involve only one shooter. However, the purpose of this course is to prepare LE responders for worst-case scenarios, including attacks that are perpetrated by multiple shooters and coordinated by terrorist groups. One key to succeeding in this type of environment is for LE responders to see the attackers before the attackers see them. Therefore, contact teams need to continually look for threats by scanning 360 degrees around them at high and low angles. This is referred to as 540-degree security. Responders must also be aware of the position of their team members and ensure that none of them are exposed to uncleared danger areas. Staying together and utilizing the team movement techniques taught in Module 5 will help contact teams achieve a high level of situational awareness and mutual protection. Solo responders need to be extra alert and scan for threats in all directions as much as possible.



Slide 2-19: Communicate Effectively

Communicate Effectively

Effective communication is necessary for successful teamwork, and teamwork is crucial if LE responders are to gain a tactical advantage over the attacker(s). Regional law enforcement agencies should continually train together to establish radio protocols for use during multi-agency active shooter response. However, even with the best-laid plans, radio communications often become unreliable during the first few minutes of an attack due to an extremely high volume of radio traffic, individuals using different channels, and environmental factors. Law enforcement responders should be familiar with their regional communications plan but also be prepared to respond effectively without reliable radio communications. During the ALERRT Level 1 course, participants will use both radio and word-of-mouth communication in order to prepare themselves to successfully communicate with and without reliable radio communications. The key to effective communication in a chaotic situation is to *keep it simple*. Responders should:

- Use plain speech (not code words)
- Get as close as possible to the person they are communicating with
- Keep their sentences short and concise

After giving a message, LE responders should look for confirmation that the intended party received and understood the message. Responders should only use hand and arm signals that are simple and commonly understood. Verbal communication is generally the most effective manner of communication when responders haven't worked together before. Responders should speak clearly and concisely but only as loud as necessary to be heard by their teammates. Tactical yelling is unnecessary and will most likely give away an LE responder's position and alert the attacker to the responder's approach.

If radio communications are unreliable, it may be necessary to use runners to deliver messages. For example, after a four-person contact team neutralizes the attacker and cannot reach command on the radio, they may need to keep two LE responders with the subject and victims while the other two locate command and deliver the message in person. The key concept to remember is that the critical tasks necessary to save lives must continue to be completed, even if radio communication is not possible.



Slide 2-20: Threshold Evaluation

Threshold Evaluation (Slicing the Pie)

For LE responders inside an active shooter situation, it is advantageous to visually clear areas before entering them. By systematically scanning an area prior to entering it, LE responders can gain important information to help coordinate their next movement. Visually clearing also enables responders to observe and engage a threat from a greater distance and from behind some degree of cover or concealment. While there are several effective visual clearing techniques, for simplicity and consistency, the only technique taught in ALERRT Level 1 is the *threshold evaluation.*

To perform a threshold evaluation, the LE responder should remain outside the threshold and, starting at one side of the doorway, systematically visually clear the visible portion of the room. He or she should then move in a semicircular pattern across the threshold while visually clearing each new portion of the room as it becomes visible.

If a deadly threat is observed, the LE responder is able to engage with deadly force while remaining partially protected by the threshold. If unarmed individuals are observed during a threshold evaluation, the responder gives hasty commands in order to put the individuals in a position of disadvantage (e.g., facing the wall with hands on head). The responder then finishes the threshold evaluation and makes entry.

While conducting a threshold evaluation, the responder should attempt to maintain a *six-feet reactionary gap* by staying at least six feet away from the threshold. This reactionary gap increases the responder's ability to react appropriately if someone unexpectedly exits the room directly in front of him or her. This person could be the attacker, or even a victim attempting to flee; therefore, it is critical that the responder has the time and distance necessary to observe the individual and react appropriately.

While conducting a visual clear prior to making entry is generally safer than entering without a visual clear, there are certain situations where it is safer to make entry without slowing down. Responders should ask the following question to help them decide if a visual clear is appropriate for a given situation: *Is the potential danger to my team greater inside the room I'm about to enter, or is the potential danger to my team greater in my current location?* If the danger to the team is perceived to be higher inside the room, then a visual clear should be done prior to entry. If the

danger to the team is perceived to be higher in their current location, then an immediate entry should be made into an area with a lower perceived level of danger. This type of entry (with no visual clear) is referred to as a *dynamic entry.*



Slide 2-21: Speed of Movement

Speed of Movement

Responders should move at the appropriate speed for the current circumstances. In an active shooter incident, time equals life. The faster the threat can be eliminated, and the critically injured victims are transported to a trauma center, the more lives will be saved. That being said, if LE responders race into a situation they are not prepared to deal with, they will likely become casualties themselves. The clock will keep ticking as the attacker continues to shoot people and critically injured victims continue to bleed, possibly to death.

Responders must realize that there is no one correct speed of movement for an active shooter response. Instead, LE responders should constantly be reassessing their current circumstances and adjusting their speed appropriately. For example, responders crossing a large soccer field to reach the adjacent high school may choose to sprint across the field because their pistols are not effective from long range, and speed is their best defense against a shooter with a rifle.

As LE responders approach the assumed location of the attacker, they should continue to move with a purpose, but also think about being smooth, quiet, and only moving as fast as they can think and respond appropriately. The appropriate speed of movement during a response often depends on whether a *driving force* exists. A driving force, also known as *actionable information*, is information that indicates an active killing is taking place and leads responders to the attacker's location. This may be the sound of gunshots, screams, or information provided by dispatch or evacuees.

The two speeds that will be discussed further in this course are *exigent speed* and *deliberate speed*. There is an appropriate time and place for each speed during an active shooter response.

Exigent Speed

This speed may be anywhere between a fast walk and a sprint. The situation will dictate which is appropriate. It is used when LE responders have reason to believe that active killing is taking place, and they have intelligence directing them toward the attacker's location. LE responders need to keep their muzzles pointed forward in order to be able to engage the attacker with relative accuracy if he or she should suddenly appear.

Deliberate Speed

This speed is a medium-paced, smooth, and quiet walk. Deliberate speed is used when a contact team is covering the last few meters before arriving at the attacker's assumed location. This is also the speed used by responders when they begin a systematic search of the building if there is no driving force present to drive them to the attacker's location. At this speed, the responder's muzzle should be stable and allow for accurate shooting.



Slide 2-22: Quick Scan Sequence

Quick Scan Sequence

Most officers will say that the first thing an officer should look at is a person's hands because their hands are what they will use to kill you. This thinking ignores the reality that in an active shooter event, not everyone holding a weapon is a threat. There will likely be officers in street clothes, school guardians, and even private citizens who are armed but not a deadly force threat. Therefore, the first step in the process needs to be to look at the overall person. Who are they? What is their demeanor? What are body posture, facial expressions, and actions indicating? From there, we look at the hands, then the waistband, and finally the area within their immediate control.

When scanning a crowd of people, facial expressions and body language will tell a lot about a person's intentions. If someone's demeanor is dramatically different than everyone else's or appears unusual given the circumstances, that should be an immediate indicator for an officer to keep an eye on them and investigate further.

Slide 2-23: A Second Disaster is Approaching

2.4 Incident Command

The Blue Tsunami

As the first officers arrive on scene to stop the killing, a second disaster is approaching the attack location. This second disaster is known as a blue tsunami. It is a tsunami comprised of all the law enforcement officers within radio range rushing to the attack site to help stop the killing. If this tsunami is allowed to hit in an uncontrolled fashion, it can swamp the attack site and hinder the ability of responders to save lives. It must be controlled if we are going to save as many lives as possible.

Police overconvergence during active shooter events is a known and serious problem. For example, 376 law enforcement officers responded to the recent attack at Robb Elementary School in the remote and rural town of Uvalde, Texas. Not having enough officers to deal with the situation is a problem, but having too many officers can also hinder response.

The overconvergence problem is an unintended consequence of the changes in police response following the 1999 Columbine High School shooting. Following that attack, we began training officers to go directly to the threat and stop the killing. It has now become part of police culture that when an active shooter event is announced, every officer within radio range rushes to the scene.

This is desirable. Because the attacks happen in random locations at random times and officers will be in random locations throughout their jurisdictions when the attack starts, we want all nearby officers to rush to the scene to stop the killing. We want the first wave of officers on the scene as quickly as possible.

However, this also creates a blue tsunami. After the first wave of officers are on scene attempting to stop the killing, dozens or hundreds of additional officers are still rushing to the scene. If

something is not done to control this deluge, the additional officers can swamp the scene and impair our ability to save lives.

In Module 10, students will receive in-depth instruction on active attack incident command. Below is a brief overview of that process.

Advice to Officers

1. If you arrive on scene during the first few minutes of the attack and there are not many officers on the scene, move quickly to stop the killing (give an LCAN and assume command if you haven't heard that call yet).
2. If you arrive on scene and you see many officers are already there, but you have not heard anyone take command, you need to start the command process. Get a briefing from someone who is there, inform dispatch that you are taking command, set staging, and address the rest of the items discussed above.
3. If you are rushing to the scene and you hear another officer take command and set staging, **go to staging!** There is still plenty of work to be done, and you will still be saving lives.
4. If you realize that the command process needs to be started and you don't do it, or if the process has been started and you don't report to staging, **you are wrong**! You are most likely harming the people you have sworn to protect.

Law enforcement has gotten much better at stopping the killing since the 1999 Columbine High School attack. It is now time to get better at the stop the dying phase of the response. This will only happen if law enforcement gets better at utilizing the incident command process.

Active Shooter Response Card

Incident Command System training prepares law enforcement officers and their supervisors to effectively manage an active shooter scene; however, it may take several minutes for an ICS-trained responder to arrive on-scene. In the meantime, there are several key incident command tasks that must be initiated within the first few minutes of an attack—or additional lives will be lost. ALERRT and the FBI have created a credit card-sized checklist called an Active Shooter Response Card. The card lists the highest-priority tasks that need to be completed within the first few minutes of an attack. Law enforcement responders can use this card as a guide to start accomplishing critical incident command tasks, even before an ICS-trained responder has arrived on-scene to assume command.



Slide 2-24: Active Shooter Response Card

LCAN Report

The initial LE responder to arrive at an active shooter scene becomes the initial Incident Commander by default, but he or she is also responsible for making immediate entry, locating the threat, and eliminating the threat. The first LE responder on-scene should immediately take command and report available information in the LCAN (location, conditions, actions, and needs) format. This initial size-up of the incident will start the process of initial incident command and will serve two functions. First, it provides critical information to other LE responders who are on the way. Second, because the format is the standard within the NIMS system, it ensures that the information is compatible with all other responding assets.

Providing an effective LCAN report immediately sets the conditions for a correct, efficient response as opposed to a disorganized, ineffective one. The LE responder can then focus on finding and stopping the killing. The initial LE responder must focus on safely finding and eliminating the threat, while at the same time starting the process of managing additional responding resources.

The LCAN should be updated as the situation changes. For example, if the shooter is engaged and killed and there is no longer an active attack, the LCAN should be immediately updated to reflect that, enabling other responders to adjust their response accordingly.

As soon as an LE responder notices that there appears to be sufficient officers hunting for the attacker, that responder should find a secure location, take out their Active Shooter Response Card, assume initial incident command, and begin completing the tasks listed on the card. The Active Shooter Response Card can also act as a guide when it is time for the initial Incident Commander to give a situation report to the ICS-trained supervisor who relieves him or her. It is important to note that initial Incident Commanders do not necessarily have to be ICS-trained responders in order to be effective. What matters most is that they are in the right place at the right time, and they know what needs to be done immediately in order to save as many lives as possible.



Slide 2-25: Rapid Response Equipment (Go Bag)

2.5 Rapid Response Equipment (Go Bags)

Having the right equipment on-hand inside an active shooter site will likely mean the difference between life and death for an LE responder and those he or she is attempting to save. Active shooter incidents unfold extremely quickly, and there will not be time to gather equipment after the shooting starts unless that equipment was previously prepared and staged in a readily accessible location.

All LE responders should have a well-stocked go bag inside their patrol vehicle. In addition, they may want to place smaller go bags in hidden locations inside their civilian vehicles in case an active shooter incident occurs while the responder is off duty. These small go bags can be as basic as an extra magazine, a police sash, and a tourniquet placed inside a Ziploc bag. This simple go bag will be invaluable if the LE responder must respond in plain clothes while off duty.

The three most crucial items to include in a basic go bag are:

1. Extra ammunition in prefilled magazines
2. Extra medical supplies, especially tourniquets
3. Clearly visible law enforcement markings (such as a police cap, police jacket, and police sash)

Although water is another critical supply item, it will likely be available inside the attack site, whereas the items listed above will only be there if the responding officer brings them with him or her.

Other items to consider adding to larger go bags include:

- Water
- Breaching equipment
- Flashlight
- Chem-lights to mark improvised explosive devices and cleared areas

- Sharpies/Post-it Notes to mark cleared rooms
- Doorstops
- Mirror for searching crawl spaces and attics

Additional medical gear to consider including in larger go bags include:

- Compact litter
- Several tourniquets that have been approved by Tactical Combat Casualty Care, Tactical Emergency Casualty Care, or both
- Medical gloves
- Trauma shears
- Gauze (Kerlix)
- Bandages (Ace or Coflex)
- Chest seals
- Space blanket
- Combat gauze infused with hemostatic agent

The proper use of tourniquets is covered in ALERRT Level 1. All other medical equipment listed above should only be used by properly trained individuals.

2.6 Basic Firearms Safety

Entering an active shooter situation is extremely dangerous. Law enforcement responders know they may get hurt or killed in the process, but they are willing to accept that risk in order to save innocent lives. The purpose of active shooter training is to enable LE responders to do this extremely dangerous job in the most effective and safest manner possible.

Slide 2-26: Basic Firearms Safety Rules

Safety in responding to an active shooter incident begins with the LE responder's own weapon. The responder's weapon is just as capable of inflicting death or serious physical injury to innocent individuals as the attacker's weapon. To prevent accidents, it is essential that LE responders adhere

to certain basic firearm safety rules during training, as well as during an actual response. The verbiage for these rules varies slightly from agency to agency, but the core concepts are the same.

Basic Firearm Safety Rules

1. Treat all firearms as if they are loaded.
2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless you intend to press it.
3. Never point a firearm at anyone unless you are justified.
4. Be sure of your target's foreground, backstop, and beyond (arc of fire).

Summary

In this module, participants were made aware of the vital lessons learned from previous active shooter incidents. Participants learned to distinguish between a hostage/barricade and an active shooter situation, and how to respond appropriately to each. The core concepts, principles, and equipment necessary to effectively respond to an active shooter incident were covered. Finally, the principles for safely handling weapons during training and real-world responses were also covered.

Module 3: Room Entry

Slide 3-1: Room Entry

Duration	60 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, participants will receive instruction on methods and tactics for making room entry in a manner that provides them the greatest tactical advantage possible over potential attackers inside the room. They will also learn to work as a team to safely clear danger areas and deal with subjects and victims they may encounter during the entry. Instruction will be conducted in a practical exercise area utilizing plastic training handguns. Participants will practice the techniques as solo responders and as part of a contact team of two, three, and four responders.
Terminal Learning Objective	Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to demonstrate how to make a safe and effective room entry as a solo responder and as part of a contact team.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 3.1 Explain the four firearms safety rules and demonstrate the firearms carry positions used by ALERRT in Level 1 training 3.2 Understand the principles that enable a contact team to make an effective room entry 3.3 Demonstrate effective techniques for one – four responders entering a corner-fed room 3.4 Demonstrate effective techniques for one – four responders entering a center-fed room 3.5 Discuss post-entry priorities 3.6 Discuss considerations when exiting a room 3.7 Discuss some contingencies that could disrupt the room entry model and demonstrate how to adapt to maintain safety and effectiveness

Resources	● Plastic training handguns (1 per instructor and participant) ● ALERRT instructor key cards
Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size
Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	The demonstration/explanation phase of the standard room entries in this module will be conducted in a group setting with all participants. At the completion of the demonstration/explanation phase of this module, all participants will practice and apply the skills in small teams with instructors facilitating the practical exercise and answering questions as needed. This module should be taught in a secure location with multiple center-fed and corner-fed rooms. After the participants have practiced and become more familiar with the standard room entry, the group will come back together to discuss contingencies and how to fix them. The participants will then break back up into smaller teams and practice reacting to contingencies to ensure every participant knows how to continue with the mission no matter what happens.
Assessment Strategy	● Observing participant behavior during exercises ● Questioning participants to ensure comprehension of module objectives ● Soliciting input from participants to explain actions during each objective

3.1 Universal Firearms Safety Rules

Treat All Weapons as if They Are Loaded

If ring guns, red guns, or other types of training pistols are not being used, conduct a thorough safety check prior to the start of instruction. The instructor cadre should inspect all live weapons and mark them as safe using a method that would prevent a live round from being introduced into the chamber of the weapon system. Instructors should explain that, regardless of the functionality of the weapon, all weapons must be treated as though they are real and capable of causing serious bodily injury or death. Instructors should also explain that they will not allow any action that they deem unsafe.

Keep Your Finger Off the Trigger Unless You Intend to Press It

Index your trigger finger is terminology that instructors will use throughout the course, and this can become a safety issue during the force-on-force training. Instructors should demonstrate the index trigger finger position as they explain, "Place your trigger finger outside the trigger guard and indexed along the frame of the weapon." They should ask the participants the following questions:

Question: "When do you put your finger on the trigger?"

Answer: "Once you perceive a threat of imminent serious bodily injury or death to yourself or that of a third person and *you've made a decision to fire.*"

Question: "When do you take your finger off the trigger?"

Answer: "Once you perceive the person is no longer a threat to yourself or a third person and prior to any post engagement movement."

Never Point a Firearm at Anyone Unless You are Justified

This is a test question and means positive muzzle awareness and control. Instructors can explain this as, "Imagine a laser coming from the muzzle of your weapon and illuminating to its maximum range. At no time do you want the laser to touch anything or anyone you do not intend to kill or destroy."

Be Sure of Your Intended Target's Foreground, Backstop, and Beyond

ALERRT promotes the idea of knowing the arc of fire from your muzzle to the target and beyond for the simple reason that it adds awareness of the path of the bullet starting at the muzzle as opposed to the target itself. Instructors can demonstrate priority of fire at this point by setting one instructor a couple of feet in front of the other and asking the class if the LE responder to the rear is clear to engage a threat down range. Explain that the arc of fire and priority of fire principles require that the LE responder in the rear steps up and gets his or her muzzle beyond the partner's body before pulling the trigger.

3.2 Firearms Positions Used During ALERRT Level 1 Training

Slide 3-2: Firearm Positions Used During Level 1

Firearm Positions

The following three firearm positions will be used during ALERRT Level 1 training to ensure safety while increasing response effectiveness.

High Combat-Ready Position

This position is used when an LE responder sees a potential deadly threat and is in the process of assessing whether to fire his or her weapon. In this position, the arms are fully extended, and the pistol is pointed at the potential threat with the sights just low enough to clearly see the subject's hands and waist. If the decision is made to fire, the weapon is raised slightly to place the sights on target and is then fired. If the decision is made not to fire, the responder remains in this position while issuing commands or lowers his or her weapon to the low combat-ready position, depending on the perceived level of threat.

Low Combat-Ready Position

This position is used any time an LE responder is searching or moving, and there are no fellow officers in front of them. This position keeps the weapon low enough to not obstruct the responder's field of vision, yet high enough to be quickly brought up on target if necessary. In this position, the arms are relaxed with elbows bent at approximately 45°. The pistol is six to eight inches in front of the sternum with the muzzle level and pointed in the direction of the area being searched.

Sul Position

Sul means south in Portuguese. Sul is a very compact, muzzle-down position used whenever responders see other responders in front of them. To come to this position from the low-ready position, LE responders should take their support hand off their weapon and place it palm-first on their chest, just below the sternum. The strong hand is then used to point the weapon's muzzle downward and rest the side of the weapon on top of the support hand. In the Sul position, the weapon's muzzle should be pointed at the ground, approximately 18 inches in front of the LE

responder's feet. The Sul position should only be used to avoid pointing a weapon at other responders. When a possible threat is observed in front of a responder, either the low-ready or high-ready position should be used, depending on the perceived threat level.

3.3 Fundamental Principles of Room Entry

General Considerations

Circumstances - Room entries will vary based on whether it is a deliberate or exigent situation.

Exigent - When there is a driving force such as gunfire or people screaming, the room entry must be conducted as quickly as possible. This means there will be little time for communication or planning. Generally, a quick threshold evaluation will be conducted. You will take a breath, give a hand signal to your team indicating that you will be entering, and then you will enter. These entries will usually be conducted with one or two people. Rarely will you have a full team of four people.

Deliberate - Deliberate entries occur when there is no driving force. They are often conducted later in an active shooter response, such as when a shooter has been taken into custody and you are now doing a systematic clear of the structure to look for another attacker or injured people. Because there is no driving force, you can take substantially more time to assess, plan, and communicate before conducting the entry. Because the situation is not exigent, you will usually have a full team of four people.

Triangle of Success - It is generally recognized in the tactical community that three elements are required for a successful room entry. These are surprise, speed, and decisive action.

Surprise - Surprise is the base of the triangle because it is critical for the success of the entry. It is also the part of the triangle for which you do not have complete control. Ideally, the attacker will have no idea that you are entering and will be completely taken by surprise. However, sometimes you make noise moving to the room, or your radio has given away your position. In cases where you cannot completely surprise the attacker, you can still regain some surprise by not broadcasting when you are about to enter. In other words, don't give a countdown out loud before making entry. Indicate your intent to enter silently to the team.

Speed - When entering, you must enter quickly. Move as quickly as you can to get through the door and to your point of domination while maintaining your ability to assess what is happening and respond appropriately (i.e., shoot if needed). The more you practice this, the faster you will be able to move, assess, and react.

Decisive Action - Decisive action is controlled aggression to achieve a tactical objective. Specifically, it is how you move and posture yourself, as well as how you communicate with

authority what you want done. Your body language should appear confident, and your voice should be clear and strong if you give commands.



Slide 3-3: Triangle of Success

Core Concepts and Principles

- Appropriate speed through the threshold to minimize the gap between responders as they enter the room.
- Go in the opposite direction of the person in front of you. If number one goes right, number two should go left, number three right, and number four left. This will vary slightly depending on the type of room being entered, but it is a good basic principle.
- Use either the cross or buttonhook technique to get from where you are outside the room to where you need to be inside the room (See slides 3-5 and 3-6).
- Move to the appropriate point of domination (POD) inside the room and stop. Any additional movement puts you at risk of being shot by another team member as you cross into their sector of fire.
- Scan your sector of fire. Your sector of fire is the area where you can safely point your weapon while keeping your sights a safe distance from other responders. This safe distance is generally considered to be one foot away from another responder's outreached weapon, or three feet from the responder's body. Properly address threats/unknowns in your sector of fire. If there are individuals in your sector of fire, you should give them appropriate verbal commands (i.e., hands up, face away).
- Call out danger areas in your sector that you are unable to visually clear. This includes open doors and any obstruction blocking a space large enough for a person to hide.
- Clearly coordinate the next movement with the team prior to leaving the POD for any reason (e.g., clear danger areas, secure weapon, cuff). Do not move from your initial POD until you have communicated the need to move, the reason for moving, and how you intend to move (i.e., "I have a danger area behind the couch in the center of the room. I want to move right with the team moving with me, so I can clear the danger area."). You should then wait for all team members to acknowledge your communication. Once all have acknowledged, you are clear to move according to the communicated plan. Generally, the team members can stay in a linear formation while they shift right or left, enabling the

responder at one end or the other to visually clear the danger area. It may be necessary to use a back-to-back technique to clear opposing danger areas. If the danger area is an open door, the team members should move to cover/concealment on either side of the open door, while one or two team members start to conduct a threshold evaluation on the open doorway.

Why ALERRT Teaches the Strong Wall Room Entry Technique

When discussing tactical room entry techniques, it is important to differentiate between intra-agency and interagency operations. During intra-agency operations, officers from the same agency work together to execute search/arrest warrants. ALERRT and the FBI do not attempt to prescribe intra-agency tactics; instead, we encourage each agency to assess all available options and choose the techniques that best meet their needs, then ensure all their officers are properly trained on that set of techniques. In contrast to intra-agency operations, an active shooter attack generally results in an interagency response, where the first officers on scene quickly form small, ad hoc teams with those present, often resulting in teams comprised of officers from various agencies. The tactics that work well for a certain agency's SWAT team may not be safe or effective when attempted by an ad hoc team of responders from different agencies, with differing levels of tactical training and experience. The objective of ALERRT training is to provide officers nationwide with one standard set of terms and tactics, so they can work safely and effectively in an ad hoc team alongside officers from different agencies.

The FBI and ALERRT have chosen the strong wall room entry technique, also referred to as known, as the standard for interagency active shooter response training because it is simple, effective, safe, and widely known. The strong wall technique has been effectively used in law enforcement operations for decades. It is easy to learn and use correctly, even for those with limited previous tactical training. Compared to other options, the strong wall technique greatly reduces the potential for depth-of-fire and crossfire situations, minimizing the danger of blue-on-blue incidents. By design, the strong wall entry places responders in a similar configuration to how they normally stand on a firing range, enabling them to exercise safe firearms habits they have formed at the range (i.e. not moving down range without getting permission first). The strong wall technique is used by several agencies nationwide and has been taught to hundreds of thousands of ALERRT students over two decades, which means officers in an ad hoc team are more likely to be on the same page if they conduct a strong wall entry versus using a less common technique.

3.4 Corner-Fed Room Entry

Definition
A corner-fed room is defined as a room where there is not sufficient space to fit a person between the doorway and the sidewall nearest the door. If there is sufficient space to fit a person between the doorway and the nearest sidewall, then the room is considered a center-fed room, regardless of whether the door is situated in the center of the room or slightly off to one side. Most rooms are corner-fed.

Solo Officer Entry
Solo officer entries will generally only be conducted under exigent circumstances. Entering a room alone is extremely dangerous and should only be done when it is necessary to save lives.

Which Direction Do I Go?
There has been much debate about this question. The image below shows a corner-fed room with three arrows representing the directions a solo officer can choose to move when entering the room. We have conducted extensive research on each direction of entry, and we briefly discuss the pros and cons of each below. Regardless of the direction you choose to go, always expect to see someone when you enter. This will help prevent you from experiencing a startle response when you are entering.



Slide 3-4: Solo Entry Directional Considerations

Unknown Wall - This path represents the solo officer moving down the wall that he or she cannot see when conducting a threshold evaluation. Because the officer cannot see along that wall, it is viewed as the primary threat area. This path allows the officer to keep their body squared with a potential attacker along the unknown wall. This gives him or her the best shooting platform so that they can shoot quickly and accurately while keeping their body armor in good alignment with the potential threat. The con is that the officer is moving directly toward the attacker, giving the attacker the best possible accuracy.

Known Wall - This path represents the solo officer moving down the wall that he or she can see during the threshold evaluation. During this entry, the officer tries to keep their body armor squared with, and weapon oriented towards, potential threats on the unknown wall while moving down the known wall (the officer's legs are pointed along the known wall, but their body is turned back toward the unknown wall). The advantage of this entry is that it laterally displaces the officer, reducing a potential attacker's accuracy. The disadvantage is that the officer's shooting platform is not squared. This generally makes the officer slow down their shots to ensure accuracy. It also makes it difficult for them to keep their body armor aligned with an attacker on the unknown wall.

Split the Difference - This path represents splitting the difference between the other two paths. Our research shows that splitting the difference gives the officer the speed, accuracy, and armor alignment like moving down the unknown wall, while reducing the accuracy of an attacker like when moving along the known wall. We therefore prefer that a solo responder split the difference to ensure the most survivability and capability to address a threat in the corner upon entry, should one be there.

What Method Do I Use? - There are two basic methods that we like: cross and buttonhook. Either is acceptable, but the cross is usually easier for officers to correctly execute.

Cross - The responder moves from a 45° position outside the room in a straight line through the threshold to end up inside the room on the opposite side of the threshold from where they started. (See blue officer in slide 3-5)

Buttonhook - The responder moves from a 45° position outside the room in a horseshoe-shaped path through the threshold to end up inside the room on the same side of the threshold they started on. (See blue officer in slide 3-6)



Slide 3-5: Solo, Cross Entry



Slide 3-6: Solo, Buttonhook Entry

How Far Do I Go into the Room? - We use a general rule of three large steps. Three steps will generally be enough to get you out of the threshold so that others can enter if you have a team, but not so far that you expose yourself to additional danger areas.

What is the Process? - It is the same process we discussed in the concepts and principles.

Size It Up - Perform a threshold evaluation. This will be an exigent situation so the threshold will be very quick. If you can see the shooter, engage him from outside of the room. If you cannot see the shooter, you will need to conduct a room entry.

Communicate - Take a breath, give the hand signal that you are entering first, and point the direction you are going. It may sound odd in a solo officer situation, but we are going to recommend communicating for three reasons.

1. Another officer may have caught up to you, but you did not notice because you were so focused on the threat.
2. It gives you a second to organize yourself so that you are not just jumping into the room after the threshold evaluation.
3. It is good practice for when you have a team.

Read and React

1. Move quickly through the threshold.
2. You choose which direction to go because you are alone and first.
3. Look at the primary threat area (probably the corner you didn't see during your threshold evaluation).
4. Hit your point of domination and stop. Because this is exigent and the suspect is shooting, you will be shooting the attacker before you hit your point of domination. This is okay. Start engaging the attacker as soon as you can identify the threat and continue firing until the threat is eliminated.

5. Scan the room. If you didn't engage an attacker, this process will probably start before you reach your point of domination. If you did engage the attacker, remember that there may be other threats and scan as soon as you can.



Slide 3-7: Solo Room Entry, Corner-Fed Room

Two-Person Entry

When we add a second person to the entry team, all the concepts and principles that we applied to solo officer entry are still valid. One difference is that we would prefer to enter along the known wall. The reason for this is if there is a gun battle in the room, we want the second officer in the fight as quickly as possible. If the first officer moves down the unknown wall and there is a threat in that deep corner of the unknown wall, then the second must move behind the first and out wider to effectively engage the attacker without a priority of fire issue. This means that the second officer might be hit crossing behind the first and will also be slower to engage.

Additionally, because this is a basic class, and we want to keep things simple as we add officers, we will also tend to favor moving more along the known wall than the unknown, as this helps ensure room for the third and fourth officers to hit their points of domination when we add those. The slide below (3-8) presents a simple two-officer entry.



Slide 3-8: Two-Person Room Entry, Corner-Fed Room

Three- and Four-Person Entry

Nothing changes from the two-officer entry, but the first officer must make certain that his or her entry is wide enough to allow the third and, if present, fourth officer to enter and get to their points of domination.

Three-Person



Slide 3-9: Three-Person Room Entry, Corner-Fed Room

Four-Person



Slide 3-10: Four-Person Room Entry, Corner-Fed Room

One exception to what we have shown so far is that if it appears that three people can handle what is happening in the room, or there isn't sufficient room for the fourth responder to step in and fill a gap, they can turn back towards the door leading into the hallway and pick up hallway security. The fourth responder may also be command at this point, as they are best suited to communicate an LCAN report to the outside world while the rest of the team inside the room deals with problems inside the room. When we discuss "deliberate" clearing, where you have no driving force and are clearing rooms and evacuating people, we can plan on using the fourth responder more in a hallway coverage/incident command role with each room entry.



Slide 3-11: Four-Person Room Entry Alternative, Corner-Fed Room

3.5 Center-fed Room Entry

Definition
A center-fed room is defined as a room with enough space for at least one person to stand on both sides of the doorway. The doorway does not need to be in the center of the room to constitute a center-fed room. Center-fed rooms are more of a challenge upon entry because the unknown wall now goes in both directions. In other words, there could be a threat on either side of the doorway as you enter.

Solo Entry
When a solo officer enters a center-fed room, they should remember the need for lateral displacement because they will have to turn their back to one unknown side for at least a moment while entering. This means you should generally enter on a path B or C trajectory and then scan back to the opposite side as quickly as possible.

Slide 3-12: Solo Entry, Center-Fed Room

Two-Person Entry
For a two-person, center-fed room entry, one responder will go to the right and the other to the left. As quickly as possible, they will scan back to the center of the room.



Slide 3-13: Two-Person Entry, Center-Fed Room

Three- or Four-Person Entry

A three- or four-person entry starts just like a two-person entry. The first officer addresses one unknown side and the second addresses the other. The third officer will go in the direction of the first officer and address the center of the room, and the fourth will go in the direction of the second officer and address the center of the room. The team should end up online with each other. Ideally, the third and fourth officers are not standing directly in front of the door.



Slide 3-14: Three-Person Entry, Center-Fed Room



Slide 3-15: Four-Person Entry, Center-Fed Room

3.6 Contingencies

What we have shown above is a basic room entry system. Of course, room entries often do not unfold the way that we were expecting. This is particularly the case in active shooter events where we are dealing with teams of officers that have not practiced together and might even come from departments that run completely different room entry systems. Also, some room designs might make our preferred entry impossible or dangerous to perform. We deal with these nonstandard situations by introducing the concept of contingencies. Here, we will deal with three common types of contingencies: someone doesn't go where they should, furniture or the room design doesn't allow us to go where we want, and rooms where doing the standard entry will expose us to danger areas. For each of these, we will illustrate using a three-person entry team. Also understand that these are just basic examples to get key concepts across.

Someone Does Not Go Where They Should



Slide 3-16: Three-Person Entry, Corner-Fed Room

In the diagram, we show the point of domination for a corner-fed three-person room entry. The circle with A in it is where the first officer should go. The circle with B is where the second officer should go, and C the third. What happens if the first officer goes to point C? We fall back on the core concept of *read and react* – go opposite of the person in front of you. In this case, the first officer did not push deeper into the room and drifted into the C spot, so the second would go right to the B spot and the third to the A spot. Of course, you could also say that the first officer appeared to move slightly to the right as they entered, so you are going to go left to the A spot. That would mean the third officer can go to the B spot. The important thing is that we get to our points of domination and cover our threat areas.

The Room Does Not Allow Our Preferred Entry



Slide 3-17: Three-Person Entry Contingency, Corner-Fed Room

In this diagram, there is a desk directly in front of the door blocking movement down the known wall and providing a very narrow entry gap to get in. In this case, the first officer must move down the unknown wall and move far enough to allow the rest of the team to move into the room. The other officers would then choose points of domination that allow them to address the rest of the room. The simplest way is to have everyone stay on the unknown wall and face the room, but there are many other possibilities. The point is that you must adapt what you are doing using the concepts and principles. This is made a little easier by the threshold evaluation we conduct prior to room entry. We can see and communicate about issues before quickly moving into the room and facing them.

Our Preferred Entry Exposes Us to a Danger Area



Slide 3-18: Corner-Fed Room with Opening on Known Wall

Here there is a door on the wall that, if we did what we normally do, would leave our backs exposed. There are several possible ways to address this.

Two are:

Block the Danger Area - The first officer could enter like normal, but then immediately turn and block the door to protect their team.



Slide 3-19: Three-Person Contingency Entry, Corner-Fed Room with Opening on Known Wall

Short the Entry - The first officer could not go as far down the known wall as usual so that their back is not exposed. The point here is again that you must apply the concepts and principles to execute an effective entry.



Slide 3-20: Three-Person Contingency Entry, Corner-Fed Room with Opening on Known Wall

3.7 Post Entry Priorities

Now that we have arrived at our points of domination (POD) in the room, we must start thinking about the rest of the room. We repeat the *size it up, communicate, read and react* process. Remember, we do not leave our POD until we have communicated with our team. If we move without communicating, we can create blue-on-blue situations.

Size it Up
Now that we are in the room, it is time to assess it again. What do we have? Are there people we need to deal with? Is there a downed suspect? Are there uncleared danger areas? We must note each of these.

Communicate
Next, we communicate what we see to the team and come up with a plan to address problems. Important things to address include:

Live Bodies - Live bodies include attackers who have dropped their weapons because they were injured, or they surrendered. Live bodies also include all other occupants of the room. To initially address live bodies, the responder gives clear commands (i.e., hands up, face the back wall). Once there is sufficient compliance, then the responder can move on to addressing danger areas. Expect that people inside a room where shots have been fired may not follow your commands. This has happened in many cases. Their hearing has physically been impaired through the sounds of gunfire in an enclosed area, plus they are emotionally overwhelmed at that point. Responders to actual events have reported having to walk up and touch people to get them to "snap out of it." Giving verbal commands is certainly worth trying, but do not be surprised when people do not follow them initially. Providing additional instructions and handcuffing of live bodies will occur later, after danger areas have been addressed.

Danger Areas - Danger areas include any uncleared areas large enough to conceal a person. To initially address danger areas, the team should decide on a coordinated movement that will enable a responder to get a look into each danger area while still being protected from other uncleared

danger areas. Responders will communicate what they see and what needs to be worked to check danger areas and "close down" the room. Communication should include who is moving, who is covering, what direction the movement is to go, etc.

Whenever possible, the responder at the edge of the team farthest from the danger area should start slicing the pie to clear the danger area, while the rest of the team gradually shifts in the same direction. This technique will position team members in a manner that enables several of them to immediately engage any attacker who suddenly appears from the danger area (slide 3-21).



Slide 3-21: Closing Down the Room, Single Danger Area

Downed Bodies - "Downed bodies" is not just the injured victims, but also includes attackers, who have been engaged by the contact team or have harmed themselves and appear to be incapacitated. A downed suspect can still pose a significant threat, so the team will keep a weapon on them while they give commands to live bodies and work on clearing remaining danger areas.

Read and React - As you are moving to address the problems in the room, read what is happening and react using the core concepts and principles of this unit.

Repeat - Repeat the process as many times as needed to "lock down" the room.

3.8 Exiting a Room

The goal of ALERRT Level 1 is to enable ad hoc teams of law enforcement responders, with varying levels of tactical training, some armed only with pistols, and responding to exigent circumstances, to be able to deliver immediate, overwhelming firepower. To accomplish this, the ad hoc contact team must remain together as much as possible so that every member can contribute if a gunfight erupts. For this reason, the ALERRT Level 1 class recommends that the entire contact team make room entry together whenever the situation requires, and the size of the room will accommodate it.

Making entry with the entire contact team leaves the hallway temporarily uncovered. As soon as possible (as soon as it is obvious the extra officer isn't necessary to work the room, or after addressing threats and danger areas inside the room), at least one responder should turn to the doorway and position themselves to protect the team from potential threats from the hallway.



Slide 3-22: Doorway Cover Position

In situations where responders enter a room and leave the hallway without coverage, they will have to tactically take the hallway back. There are two options. First, enter the hallway like a center-fed room, or second, a technique that is less dynamic and introduces less of the officers' bodies into the hallway. Once two responders are available, they can do a coordinated back-to-back movement to regain more complete visual control of the hallway, while still using the threshold for cover/concealment. This technique is often referred to as the Israeli Lean. It is not a dynamic corner clear, but a coordinated, simultaneous lean out the door. Both officers should be looking in their respective directions at the same time. The goal is to limit how much of their bodies are exposed as the officers regain full visibility of what is happening in the hallway.



Slide 3-23: The Israeli Lean

When a contact team has finished clearing a room, they should come up with a plan for their next movement and check the status of their weapons before moving back into the hallway. The team should also ensure they provide their LCAN and listen to see if any other responders have arrived on scene and are working close to their location. Once the team is ready to exit the room, they can

either conduct an Israeli Lean, or recapture the hallway by making a standard center-fed room entry into the hallway. The team then reforms into their hallway moving technique and continues to move toward their next objective.

Summary

In this module, participants were instructed on room entry tactics and danger areas, as both solo responders and as members of a contact team. Post entry priorities of work were also discussed, as well as how to exit a room effectively and safely. Finally, participants were shown some realistic situations that could occur, which could disrupt the standard entry model we practice, so we showed how to fix these issues should they arise.

Module 4: Approaching and Entering the Attack Site

Slide 4-1: Approaching and Entering the Attack Site

Duration	60 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, participants will learn to approach an attack site quickly, discreetly, and safely. They will practice using teamwork and effective cover to approach while under fire. Basic methods of gaining access to a locked building will also be covered.
Terminal Learning Objective	Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to successfully approach and enter an attack site quickly and safely, even if they come under fire and encounter locked doors.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 4.1 Explain the process of gearing up, approaching the attack location, and where to go/park 4.2 Approach an attack site quickly, discreetly, and safely 4.3 Recognize the difference between effective and ineffective cover 4.4 Demonstrate how to use teamwork and effective cover to safely move while under fire 4.5 Understand how to enter locked buildings quickly, discreetly, and safely
Resources	• Plastic training handguns (1 per instructor and participant) • Several vehicles, parked in a staggered manner leading up to the attack site • ALERRT Instructor Key Cards
Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size

Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	The demonstration/explanation phase of this module will be conducted in a group setting with all participants. At the completion of the demonstration/explanation phase of the module, all participants will practice and apply the skills in small teams with instructors facilitating the practical exercise and answering questions as needed. If possible, this module should be taught in a secure parking lot with several vehicles parked in a staggered manner. There should be a building representing the attack site at one end of the parking lot.
Assessment Strategy	• Observing participant behavior during exercises • Questioning participants to ensure comprehension of module objectives • Soliciting input from participants to explain actions during each objective

4.1 Approaching the Attack Site Quickly, Discreetly, and Safely

Approaching and entering the attack site is an extremely dangerous phase of an active shooter response. This is because LE responders will have very little information about the attacker's location, but the attacker will likely have a good idea where the responders will appear. Some attackers are fully expecting a police response and have planned to ambush the LE responders. Other attackers are distracted when responders first arrive and will only notice the presence of LE responders if something happens to attract their attention. Responders need to consider both types of attackers and approach in a manner that is quick, discreet, and cautious.

Although speed is critical in an active shooter response, reckless and unplanned approaches may result in responders becoming incapacitated before they even see the attacker. The key to an effective approach is to balance speed with security. Even before they arrive at the scene, LE responders should be planning their approach by asking themselves the following questions:

- Am I needed at the attack location or staging?
- If part of the first responding officers, what is the fastest route to the attacker's location?
- Where would the attacker expect me to approach from?
- Is there another approach route that is also quick but affords better cover/concealment and may be unexpected by the attacker?

Law enforcement responders should also consider the following:

- The first responding officers go to the attack location. Secondary responders report to staging for assignment.
- Park vehicles on the side of the road or grass so that access routes are not blocked.
- There must be a balance between officer safety and the need to stop the killing. Each situation will be different, and officers should tailor their approach based on the information available to them. They should be constantly mindful that every second they delay affords the suspect more time to create victims.
- Try to approach from a direction unexpected by the attacker. Responders should consider alternate breach points. For example, if the attacker shot out the front doors and made entry there, LE responders might consider entering from the side or back of the building if this can be done quickly.

4.2 Effective versus Ineffective Cover

As LE responders plan a quick, discreet, and safe approach, they should consider using a route that affords cover and concealment. Cover refers to objects that will stop bullets. Concealment involves objects that may not stop bullets but can hide the responders' location, making them a more difficult target to hit.

Generally speaking, main or front entrances to public buildings afford less cover and concealment than side or back entrances. This is because architects want their buildings to be seen, not obscured by trees and other objects. While it is tempting for responders to drive their cars up to the front doors and then exit their vehicles, this course of action can lead to disaster if it attracts the attacker's

attention. The attacker will be able to take well-aimed shots at the responder while the responder is attempting to exit the vehicle. Instead of approaching wide-open front or main entrances, LE responders should try to use side or back entrances. They should approach quickly and quietly, on foot, while remaining close to trees, buildings, and vehicles in case those are needed for cover.

In some circumstances, using a vehicle for cover is not the best course of action. Depending on the circumstances, sometimes it may be better for a responder to separate from his or her vehicle and find hard cover somewhere else.

Regardless of what kind or type of hard cover is used, LE responders should be careful not to crowd the cover. Crowding or remaining too close to the cover limits the angles an LE responder can use for observation and firing. It also increases the chances that a responder will be injured by spalling. *Spalling* is when fragments of bullets and pieces of cover fly back and hit the LE responder as rounds impact the cover. Remember, cover can deteriorate and become ineffective over time as it is struck by gunfire. *Eventually, even the best cover goes away*.

Examples of good hard cover in a rural and suburban environment:

- Dirt berms
- Large trees
- Rocks

Examples of good hard cover in an urban environment:

- Concrete barriers
- Walls
- Corners of buildings

4.3 Using Teamwork and Effective Cover to Move Under Fire

If LE responders do not observe any signs of an ambush zone (e.g., injured officers or incoming rounds) while approaching on foot, they should *not* stop to take cover. They should keep moving at a good speed while scanning the doors and windows of the attack site. Speed is the responder's best protection. Even trained snipers find it extremely difficult to hit a target that is moving at running speed, while they can easily hit stationary targets and targets moving at walking speed.

If LE responders see evidence of an ambush zone along their planned route, they should immediately take cover then quickly redirect to a different approach route. Responders who find themselves pinned down with no acceptable alternate route will have to use effective communication and teamwork to safely move through the ambush zone. Remaining in place behind cover for a lengthy period of time should not be an option. During that time, an attacker can shoot more people, and the victims they already shot may continue bleeding (possibly to death). Law enforcement responders must keep moving with urgency until the active shooter clock has stopped, which occurs when the attacker has been neutralized and all critically injured victims are en route to a trauma center.

Bounding

One combat-proven technique for safely moving through an ambush zone is called *bounding.* It is also referred to as *bounding overwatch*. In an ideal situation, bounding overwatch requires at least two responders, but preferably four or more. The responders are divided into two teams. One team provides overwatch while the other team quickly moves, or bounds, to the next position of cover. The teams then switch roles, and this process continues until both teams have safely moved through the ambush zone.

The overwatch team covers, or provides protection for, the bounding team by visually scanning all doors and windows for threats and engaging those threats with accurate fire, as authorized by their agency's deadly force policy. The bounding team first visually checks to ensure that the overwatch team is in place, then decides on their next position of cover and moves at sprint speed to that position. Then they set up to provide overwatch for the other team.



Slide 4-2: Overwatch Figure 1

Bounds from cover to cover should be short enough to be completed in two to three seconds, or the time it takes to say the words, "I'm up. He sees me. I'm down." Bounds longer than this provides an attacker with the time needed to track and engage a moving target with increased accuracy. The bounding team should never cross in front of the overwatch team. If possible, each team should stay in their lane (i.e., the left team remains on the left side of center and the right team remains on the right side of center).



Slide 4-3: Overwatch Figure 2

Slide 4-3 shows how one team moves forward while the overwatch team provides security for their movement. Once the forward team is set, the overwatch team will move. Some military and SWAT teams use specific commands to communicate between teams during bounding overwatch; however, the best option for LE responders from different agencies is to use plain speech and visual confirmation to coordinate this movement. Communication might sound something like this:

"The shooter is in the top, left window shooting at responders as they cross the parking lot. There are no good alternate routes. Our team will stay here and watch for threats while your team moves to those trees. Once there, your team will watch for threats while we move to those cars, then we will watch for threats while your team moves to the side door and makes entry."



Slide 4-4: Overwatch Figure 3

As slide 4-4 shows, the teams alternate covering and moving until they reach the point where they can take other action, such as making an entry. As the teams move forward, an opportunity could present itself to isolate, distract, or neutralize the attacker at any point during the movement.

It is also relevant to point out that the bounding technique can work well for the solo responder. In the case of a solo officer, bounding can be used to move from one position of cover to the next, using short bounding movements. Solo responders will not have the benefit of an overwatch element due to being by themselves.

4.4 Entering Locked Buildings Quickly, Discreetly, and Safely

Officers responding to an active shooter incident must gain access to locked buildings quickly and safely, preferably without being noticed by the attacker. They must also accomplish this task using only items they routinely carry on their person or in their vehicle. Trained and properly equipped breachers have no problem quickly making entry into most locked buildings.

Unfortunately, the reality is that trained and properly equipped breachers will probably not be present when the first LE responders arrive on scene. For this reason, ALERRT Level 1 focuses on preparing all LE responders, especially those without formal breaching training who don't routinely carry breaching tools in their vehicle, to successfully gain access to a locked building quickly, discreetly, and safely. Getting inside the building quickly and safely is what matters, not the specific technique used. Responders should be creative and make use of improvised tools to get inside the building however they can.

Responders should first check the door to see if it is locked. If locked, they should check nearby alternate entrances. If all nearby entrances are locked, responders should keep in mind the following critical factors as they decide how best to enter the locked building:

Kicking Doors and Using Improvised Rams

While a good kick will open many inward-opening wooden doors, it is important to remember that standard school and other public building exterior doors are outward-opening steel doors with steel frames. Using a foot, shoulder, or an improvised ram on this type of door may not be effective and may cause injury. In addition, the noise from this technique will likely attract the attention of the attacker. The best option for LE responders who are faced with outward-opening steel doors without the proper tools is to find another way into the building.

Vehicle Ramming

Using a vehicle to ram doors is often ineffective and extremely dangerous. To have any effect on standard outward-opening steel doors, a vehicle has to be moving at a speed that may cause airbags to deploy and pin the doors shut, disorienting and possibly trapping the LE responder inside. If vehicle ramming is the only option available, it should be done using the back of the vehicle, not the front. However, use of this technique is likely to be noticed by the attacker.

Firearm Breaching

Ballistic breaching should only be performed by properly trained and equipped breachers. However, in an exigent circumstance involving properly-trained LE responders, the use of a standard police shotgun has proven reliable and effective. Without the proper equipment and training, an LE responder who uses a firearm to breach a door could end up sending dangerous fragments into a building full of people he or she is trying to rescue. In addition, shooting steel doors without proper training could result in an entangled metal mess of a door that still doesn't open.

Breaking Windows

Windows are another option for gaining quick entry in a safe and relatively discreet manner. Responders should choose a window that will allow them to make entry a safe distance away from the attacker. They can use a window punch, rock, or other readily available objects to break the window, and then run a baton, large stick, or the muzzle of a rifle barrel around the entire frame to dislodge any remaining glass shards. Glass shards left in place can cause serious injury to responders as they attempt to climb through the window frame.

Using Keys

Often, the quickest, most discreet, and safest method of entering a locked building is to locate a key—as long as keys can be located *immediately*. Responders can look around to see if any evacuees appear to be employees and ask them if they have a key, or if they know where one can

be found. However, if a key cannot be located quickly, LE responders should use another technique to enter the area without delay.

KnoxBox®

A KnoxBox, known officially as the KNOX BOX® Rapid Entry System, is a small, wall-mounted safe that holds building keys for fire departments, emergency medical services, and sometimes police to retrieve in emergency situations. Local fire companies can hold master keys to all boxes in their response area so that they can quickly enter a building without having to force entry or find individual keys held in deposit at the station. Sometimes, KnoxBoxes are linked via radio to the dispatch station, where the dispatcher can release the keys with DTMF tones. This technology may be used in your jurisdiction and could become critically important for entry into a crisis site. Proper awareness and training before a critical incident will enable responders to be able to use this technology.

Slide 4-5: KnoxBox

Summary

In this module, effective, quick approaches were discussed, as well as movement techniques under fire. Effective methods of gaining access into buildings were also presented.

For more information on the ALERRT program, please visit our website at
www.ALERRT.org

Module 5: Interior Movement and Set Up for Room Entry

Slide 5-1: Interior Movement and Set Up for Room Entry

Duration	95 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, participants will receive instruction on methods and tactics for safely moving through the hallways of an attack site and setting up to conduct a room entry. Instruction will be conducted in a practical exercise area using plastic training handguns. Participants will practice the techniques as a solo responder and as part of a contact team of two, three, and four responders.
Terminal Learning Objective	Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to demonstrate how to move through internal hallways quickly and safely and how to set up to make an effective room entry either as a solo responder, or as part of a contact team.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 5.1 Demonstrate safe movement through hallways and set up to make room entry using threshold evaluation as a solo responder and as part of a contact team of two to four responders 5.2 Describe when a dynamic entry should be used instead of a threshold evaluation 5.3 Demonstrate how to set up for entry on a room with a closed/locked door 5.4 Discuss possible options and contingency plans that can be used to create coordinated distractions and alternative entry points.
Resources	• Plastic training handguns (1 per instructor and participant) • ALERRT Instructor Key Cards

Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size
Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	The demonstration/explanation phase of this module will be conducted in a group setting with all participants. At the completion of the demonstration/explanation phase, all participants will practice and apply the skills in small teams with instructors facilitating the practical exercise and answering questions as needed. This module should be taught in a secure location with wide hallways and multiple doors. Preferably inward-opening and outward-opening doors with self-closing mechanisms will be available.
Assessment Strategy	● Observing participant behavior during exercises ● Questioning participants to ensure comprehension of module objectives ● Soliciting input from participants to explain actions during each objective

5.1 Movement and Set Up for Entry with a Threshold Evaluation

Driving Force or Actionable Information

As LE responders approach and enter the attack site, they should be looking and listening for a *driving force*, or actionable information, to lead them to the attacker's location. A driving force can be either signs of active killing (e.g., gunshots, screams), information provided by evacuees, or dispatch concerning the attacker's whereabouts. If there is evidence of a driving force or actionable information, the LCAN report should be immediately updated as the responder moves to encounter the threat.

If LE responders are being driven by signs of active killing, they should move at exigent speed to the attacker's location. While moving at exigent speed, they should take a quick glance in the direction of each open door and hallway they pass by. The purpose of this quick glance is to collect a snapshot of information about uncleared areas, without slowing down the contact team's movement toward the shooter's assumed location. These snapshots may reveal unexpected threats, casualties, or both. Responders should deal with unexpected threats immediately, but they should avoid slowing down or stopping to treat casualties until all known threats have been neutralized.

If responders do not have a clear driving force, they should question bystanders or evacuees to find out key information like the location and description of the attacker, as well as the location of injured individuals. If responders discover that the attacker has committed suicide or left the attack site, they should establish appropriate security then turn their focus to treating and transporting the wounded.

Solo Responder Movement and Set Up for Entry

The first officer on scene should not wait for more officers to enter an attack site. How far and how fast they push into the location will depend on the information available to them. If they have a driving force, they will move quickly to the attack location and work to stop the killing. A driving force is any information or observations the officer has that would indicate where the attack is happening. If, after making an initial entry, the officer has absolutely no indication of where to go, only then should he or she slow or stop their advance to wait for backup.

If the solo officer has a driving force, he or she will move quickly. A fast jog or sprint may be required, as every second of delay affords the actor time to create more victims. In this instance, speed is security. The officer's body and weapon are facing the direction of the perceived threat. They may glance into rooms as they pass, but their primary focus is on their direction of travel.

Upon arrival at the attacker's location, the solo responder should conduct a quick threshold evaluation. They should then engage the attacker with deadly force or issue commands, depending on the circumstances.

When dealing with an attacker inside the room, the responders should attempt to use part of the threshold as cover and concealment. If the attacker is able to incapacitate a solo responder, there will be no one left to stop the shooter from continuing to kill innocent victims. Therefore, a solo

responder must take extra care to ensure their rounds are well aimed and sufficient in number to immediately neutralize the threat.

If a solo responder observes a potential subject during the threshold evaluation, under circumstances not warranting deadly force, the LE responder should give clear and concise commands to place the individual in a position of disadvantage (e.g., kneeling, facing away with hands on head). The LE responder should then finish his or her threshold evaluation, while keeping an eye on the potential attacker, and make entry. These steps must be completed relatively quickly to minimize the solo responder's vulnerability to potential threats in the hallway.

Attackers who appear to be surrendering can quickly become violent again; therefore, solo responders should avoid holstering their weapon to handcuff an attacker or go hands on. Instead, they should cover the attacker with their weapon until backup arrives.

Solo responders in plain clothes must constantly be aware that additional LE responders are en route and may mistake the solo responder for an attacker. Solo responders in plainclothes must take extra measures to identify themselves as law enforcement by wearing clearly visible law enforcement markings and making repeated verbal announcements of their presence. If safe to do so, the solo responder may engage a citizen for help by asking the person to go outside and provide follow-on responders with a description and location of the solo responder.

Even with these measures, solo responders in plainclothes are at a great risk of being mistaken for an attacker and should therefore consider holstering their weapon once the threat is neutralized and follow-on responders are nearby. Solo responders should work to identify themselves verbally and visually along with using the assistance of others in the immediate area.

If no attackers are observed during the threshold evaluation, the solo responder should move to a position 45° off the center of the doorway and prepare to make entry. By starting an entry at a 45° position (instead of tight against the wall), the responder will be able to pass through the threshold quickly and smoothly, without hitting the door frame and taking side steps (see slide 5-2).



Slide 5-2: 45° Position

Post Engagement

In the first few minutes after a deadly force encounter, it is extremely important for the solo responder to assess, and attempt to improve, their security situation. The recent gunfight likely drew attention to their position, and they have no partner to help cover danger areas and watch for potentially deadly threats that might arise. Potentially deadly threats might include the subject they just shot, other attackers, or even follow-on responders who could misidentify the solo officer as a threat.

If in a hallway, the solo responder should consider moving tactically into a room, as it is generally easier to establish security inside a room versus an uncleared hallway. Before making room entry, the solo responder should check their weapon status and reload (if necessary), conduct a threshold evaluation, set up at a 45° angle, take a deep breath, then make a tactically sound room entry as described in Module 3 (Room Entry). The 45° position enables the responder to enter more efficiently than starting flush with the wall, while also providing more cover than they would have if standing directly in front of the doorway. Not every doorway or hallway will allow the responder to stand exactly in the 45° position, but they should do their best to set up at an angle that will provide some cover and enable an efficient movement into the room.

Once security has been established, the solo responder can update their LCAN report, check themselves for injury, and address the other critical tasks discussed in Module 7 (Security, Incident Command, Medical).

Two-Person Movement and Set Up for Room Entry (Exigent Speed)

When moving at exigent speed with two responders, it is recommended that the two-person tether technique be used. In the two-person tether, the first person (called *point*) faces the direction of travel. Point sets the pace of movement and calls out open doors and danger areas as the team approaches. Point is responsible for scanning danger areas to the front and sides.

The second responder (called *rear guard*) has their feet and head facing forward but glances to the rear about every two seconds to scan for threats behind the team. Rear guard keeps one hand lightly touching point's back, which helps rear guard maintain proper spacing with point, even when looking backward. Rear guard can either maintain his or her weapon at the Sul position or hold it behind themself with the muzzle pointed at the ground.

When point calls out an open door, rear guard responds, "got it" and quickly glances into the danger area as the team passes by. This allows rear guard to get a snapshot of the rear-facing angles point did not see (see slide 5-3).

Slide 5-3: Two-Person Tether

If either point or rear guard observes a potential threat while moving, he or she should call out, "Police, don't move!" (or appropriate identification for their agency), as they determine if deadly force is appropriate. It is possible that several other officers may already be inside the building, some in plain clothes, so just because you see someone holding a weapon doesn't necessarily mean they are the attacker. Yelling, "Police, don't move!" instead of something like "Target" or "Threat front," makes it very clear who you are and greatly reduces the chances of a blue-on-blue shooting. That being said, if it is absolutely clear that the armed person you have encountered is the attacker, you may need to engage first and identify yourself later in order to not lose the advantages of speed and surprise (which may determine who wins the gunfight). Keep in mind that these are only some considerations. Your decision on how or when you identify yourself and use deadly force is situationally dependent. It should be determined by each individual officer based on the totality of circumstances and in line with their agency's deadly force policy. Either calling out, "Police, don't move!" or firing your weapon is a clear signal to your partner that they should turn to face the threat, get shoulder-to-shoulder with his or her partner, and assist with engaging the threat. This mutual support in engaging threats enables the contact team to quickly achieve superiority of firepower over the attacker; however, it also temporarily leaves one direction unprotected. For this reason, as soon as the observed threat is neutralized, LE responders should immediately return to scanning their initial area of responsibility. The sound of gunfire will likely attract any additional attackers who may be present, so the contact team needs to reestablish 540° protection as quickly as practical.

When a two-person contact team arrives at a room from which signs of active killing can be heard, point (in blue on slide 5-4) should start a quick threshold evaluation and engage any deadly threats as soon as they become visible. While the first LE responder is engaging deadly threats inside the room, the second LE responder (in red on slide 5-4) should attempt to visually acquire the subject by moving up next to the first LE responder's side. If the second LE responder's view of the subject is blocked by the threshold, the second LE responder should go to the Sul position and move around the first LE responder's back to his or her other side. The second LE responder should then get shoulder-to-shoulder with the first LE responder and assist in engaging the subject (see slide 5-4).



Slide 5-4: Number Two Moves to Visually Acquire Attacker

Getting multiple guns in the fight is critical if superiority of firepower is to be achieved. However, two or more guns shooting through the same threshold is extremely dangerous if the following safety rules are not followed:

1. The second responder should not bump or push the first responder while attempting to visually acquire the subject. The first responder is probably in the process of lining up a shot, and a bump from the second responder may send that round into an innocent civilian instead of into the attacker.

2. Responders should not follow their bullets into the room. Making an immediate, uncoordinated entry after firing rounds into a room is extremely dangerous because doing so places the responder directly in front of other responders who may be in the act of firing at the subject.

3. A responder who can't get shoulder-to-shoulder must not engage. Responders who are shoulder-to-shoulder before engaging prevent their partner from inadvertently sidestepping in front of their muzzle.

After the threat is neutralized, responders should consider what happens next. There will be many options competing for limited time and available resources. The LE responder's objective is to use overwhelming and accurate firepower to neutralize the threat before the attacker can return fire. However, in a close-range gunfight, a responder may get hit. Sometimes the responder may not realize he or she has been hit until the fight is over. The LE responders have some things to work through at this point. Once the suspect has been engaged and neutralized, weapons may need to be reloaded and officers may be wounded.

Post Engagement

The team should aspire to accelerate the process of getting into a better location from which to operate. However, before making room entry, responders should, at a minimum:

- Ensure their weapon is functional (e.g., undamaged, in battery, and reloaded if necessary)
- Provide an LCAN – Preferably prior to making entry but not absolute – The situation will dictate
- Finish the threshold evaluation to visually clear as much of the rest of the room as possible

In past active shooter attacks involving multiple perpetrators, the shooters have been found in the same room acting together. For this reason, completing the necessary steps to prepare for a second gunfight before making entry is critical.

Complete the Threshold Evaluation

Completing the threshold evaluation of the room prior to entering ensures responders can see things they may have missed during the initial approach and assessment of the room. Things may have changed while the responders were engaging the threat. Looking at how the room is configured and the disposition of the people in the room prior to entry doesn't take long. Responders may find it useful to issue quick verbal directions to those inside the room in order to move them away from where they intend to enter and occupy space. Often, the occupants may not respond quickly to verbal directions because they are confused or in shock. This shouldn't be considered a sign of active resistance or potential aggression toward responders—it is more likely a result of high stress levels, inability to hear due to gunfire, or both. Responders must take this into consideration and not spend excessive time waiting for compliance before making entry. It may be necessary to physically encourage people by touching them to get their attention and gain compliance.



Slide 5-5: Two-Person Set Up for Room Entry

Three-Person Movement and Set Up (Exigent Speed)

When moving at exigent speed with three responders, it is recommended that the three-person tether technique be used. In the three-person tether, point sets the pace of movement and calls out open doors and danger areas to the front and left side. The second responder stands next to and online with point and provides coverage to the front and right side. Rear guard has the same responsibilities as described under the two-person tether technique (see slide 5-6).

Threats to the front and rear are handled the same as with the two-person tether, with everyone on the team turning to face the threat, getting online, and engaging. As soon as the threat is neutralized, all responders return to their original areas of responsibility and reestablish 540° protection.



Slide 5-6: Three-Person Tether

At exigent speed, when a three-person contact team arrives at the room where signs of active killing can be heard, the responder to reach the door first should start a quick threshold evaluation and engage any deadly threats as soon as they become visible. The other two responders should take up positions alongside the first responder and assist with engaging the subject.

After the threat is neutralized, each LE responder should check their weapon and update their LCAN. This will require effective communication among the contact team so that security is not dropped at any time.

After reloading, the two responders closest to the doorway move to opposing 45° positions and prepare to make entry as number one and number two, while the third responder takes a position back-to-back with either number one or number two and picks up hallway coverage in the direction of the greatest perceived threat.

Immediately prior to entry, the responder providing hallway coverage receives an elbow nudge, turns to face the room, gives a tricep squeeze and enters as number three.

Four-Person Movement and Set Up (Exigent)

When moving at exigent speed with four responders, it is recommended that the four-person diamond technique be used. The diamond technique works well with both exigent speed and deliberate speed. In the four-person diamond, the first person (point) faces the direction of travel. Point sets the pace of movement for the team and calls out open doors and danger areas to the front. The second and third responders (right cover and left cover) are a few inches behind point. Right cover and left cover scan for threats on their corresponding sides and call out open doors and danger areas. The fourth responder is rear guard and has the same responsibilities as described under the two-person tether technique (see slide 5-7).

Slide 5-7: Four-Person Diamond

The four-person diamond is a very efficient technique. Because there is a clearly identified leader, the team can move quickly through complex hallways without confusion or miscommunication by simply following the leader.

The diamond is also a flexible technique. If the team needs to get through an extremely narrow passageway or push through a large crowd of evacuees, the responders on both sides simply move into the center and the diamond becomes a single stack.

In order to protect point from being exposed to side threats, as a four-person diamond approaches an open danger area on either side, the cover person on that side moves slightly forward to get in line with and protect point from the danger area. If there are open danger areas on both sides of the hallway (such as a four-way intersection), both side cover positions move forward to be online with point. After the danger area is passed, the side cover responders move back to their original positions.

If a four-person diamond encounters a threat to the front or rear while moving, it is handled the same as with the two- and three-person tether. However, if there is not sufficient space for all four responders to stand side-by-side and face the threat, one responder remains on rear guard during the engagement.

At exigent speed, when a four-person diamond arrives at the room where signs of active killing can be heard, the first responder to reach the door starts a quick threshold evaluation and engages any deadly threats as soon as they become visible. The next two responders take up positions alongside the first responder and assist with engaging the attacker. There probably won't be enough space for the fourth responder to get online with the others, so instead of assisting in engaging the subject, the fourth responder should continue to scan the hallway for additional threats.

After the threat is neutralized, each responder should perform a weapon system check as previously described. After conducting the check, the two responders closest to the doorway move to opposing 45° positions and prepare to make entry as number one and number two, while the third and fourth responders position themselves back-to-back with either number one or number two and pick up hallway coverage. Immediately before entry, number one and number two signal the responders behind them with an elbow nudge. Both hallway cover responders turn to face the room and give a tricep squeeze. Number one communicates with number two, number two depresses his or her muzzle, and number one initiates the room entry.

Two-Person Movement and Set Up for Room Entry (Deliberate Speed)

If a contact team believes there still may be an active shooter inside the attack site, but they have no driving force or actionable intelligence to guide them to a specific location, they should use deliberate speed instead of exigent speed as they conduct a systematic search of the entire building. At deliberate speed, responders should be able to use more precise tactical movements in order to increase their ability to observe and effectively engage the active shooter, once he or she is located.

When preparing to enter a room at deliberate speed, a two-person contact team can perform a threshold evaluation with hallway cover to gain the advantage of a visual clear of the room, while

maintaining their ability to immediately engage any threats that may appear down the hallway. A threshold evaluation with hallway cover should be conducted quickly, quietly, and efficiently.

Two-Person Threshold Evaluation with Hallway Cover

Point quietly communicates his or her intention to rear guard as they approach the doorway (e.g., "Open door on the right. I'm going to do a threshold evaluation. You pick up long cover."). Point (in blue in slide 5-8) becomes room cover and starts a threshold evaluation, while rear guard (in red in slide 5-8 and slide 5-9) turns to face forward and becomes long cover. Long cover gently rests his or her wrist against the shoulder or back of room cover, and both responders move forward together until the threshold evaluation is complete. Long cover repositions as necessary throughout the movement to maintain his or her weapon beyond room cover's torso, but not far enough out that someone inside the room would see it before room cover sees them. Slides 5-8 through 5-12 show the progression of the threshold evaluation from initial set up, the movement across the threshold, and finally the set up for two-person room entry once the evaluation is complete.



Slide 5-8: Two-Person Tether Approaches Door

Slide 5-9: Threshold Evaluation with Long Cover



Slide 5-10: Movement Across Threshold



Slide 5-11: Completed Threshold Evaluation



Slide 5-12: Two-Person Set Up After Threshold Evaluation

If either responder starts to engage a deadly threat during the threshold evaluation, the other responder turns toward the threat, gets shoulder-to-shoulder with his or her partner, and assists in engaging the threat. If the evaluator sees a potential attacker in the room during the threshold evaluation, but deadly force is not justified, he or she should give commands to place the potential subject in a position of disadvantage, and the team should make entry. Responders should be mindful of not spending excessive time in uncleared hallways, especially after giving commands. They should also be sure not to make other loud noises that may give away their position.

While most active attacks have been carried out by only one person, responders should always assume there are multiple attackers inside the building. This mindset will keep the team constantly alert and on guard, which may mean the difference between life and death if they do encounter multiple attackers, or if they misidentify an unknown individual as the attacker and start giving commands while the real attacker is just around the next corner.

Communication Prior to Making Entry

Clear communication between contact team members prior to making a room entry is critical to ensure that all team members are prepared to make entry simultaneously. If possible, point should communicate to the team his or her intention to enter a room while the team is still a good distance from the doorway. This can be done verbally but quietly (e.g., "Let's enter the next open door on our right.").

As the team gets closer to the doorway when moving at deliberate speed, they should try to avoid using verbal communications, so they don't broadcast their location and intentions to adversaries inside the room. Once at the doorway, all communication should be done nonverbally. Responders can use an elbow nudge to communicate with someone directly behind them and a tricep squeeze to communicate with someone directly in front of them. A tricep squeeze is clearer than a tap because it cannot be confused with an unintentional bump.

When a responder needs to communicate with a partner on the opposite side of an open door, the responder should use a hand signal to indicate his or her intention to be number one. He or she should then wait for the second responder across the doorway to lower his or her muzzle as confirmation that he or she is ready to enter as number two. It is important that number one does not make entry until number two's muzzle is down. Otherwise, number one might cross in front of number two's muzzle just as number two starts firing at a threat inside the room. Responders can think of it like the starting gate in a horse race – number one is the horse, and number two's muzzle is the gate. No matter how anxious number one is to get moving, he or she cannot cross the line until number two opens the gate by lowering his or her muzzle.

Three-Person Movement and Set Up (Deliberate Speed)

When there is no driving force or actionable information to guide the contact team to the attacker's location, the team should move at deliberate speed while they conduct a systematic search of the attack site.

At deliberate speed, when a three-person contact team approaches a room they intend to enter, the responder closest to the wall with the doorway to be entered moves up next to the wall (approximately six feet from the doorway), visually clears what he or she can see in the room, moves to a 45° position, and prepares to be number two for the entry.

Simultaneously, the other LE responder who is facing forward begins to conduct a threshold evaluation, while the rear guard turns to act as long cover (similar to the two-person set up). Following the threshold evaluation, the LE responder who conducted the threshold evaluation moves to a 45° position and assumes the role of number one for entry (because he or she has seen more of the room than anyone else). Long cover remains behind number one, continuing to provide

hallway cover. Immediately before entry, number one signals both long cover (using an elbow nudge) and number two (using a chest tap and *I am number one* hand signal). Long cover responds by turning to face the door and giving number one a tricep squeeze. Number two lowers his or her muzzle, and number one leads the contact team in making entry. Slides 5-13 through 5-17 show the three-person set up at deliberate speed.



Slide 5-13: Three-Person Tether Movement



Slide 5-14: Starting Threshold Evaluation



Slide 5-15: Conducting Threshold Evaluation



Slide 5-16: Threshold Evaluation Complete



Slide 5-17: Three-Person Set Up for Room Entry

Four-Person Movement and Set Up (Deliberate Speed)

When a four-person contact team is moving at deliberate speed instead of exigent speed, they have the time to set up for room entries in a more precise manner, ensuring 540° security is effectively maintained throughout the entire process. The responder closest to the wall with the door moves up next to the wall and visually clears what he or she can see in the room from that position, then moves to a 45° position and prepares to be number two for the entry.

Simultaneously, point conducts a threshold evaluation, with the responder on the hallway side acting as long cover. After the threshold evaluation is complete, point moves to a 45° position and prepares to be number one for the entry (see slides 5-18 through 5-21).

Immediately before entry, the two responders facing the room signal the responders behind them with an elbow nudge. Long cover and rear guard turn to face the room and give a tricep squeeze, number two lowers his or her muzzle, and number one leads the contact team in making entry. Slides 5-18 through 5-21 show the four-person set up at deliberate speed.



Slide 5-18: Four-Person Set Up



Slide 5-19: Four-Person Threshold Evaluation



Slide 5-20: Four-Person Threshold Evaluation Complete



Slide 5-21: Four-Person Set Up for Room Entry

5.2 Dynamic versus Deliberate Room Entry

When a contact team is forced to make an immediate room entry due to extremely dangerous circumstances encountered in a hallway, the team leader may choose to call for a dynamic room entry. A dynamic room entry is done very quickly, without taking extra time to conduct a complete threshold evaluation beforehand. The team members will still have their heads up, gathering as much information about the interior of the room as possible while making entry, but there will be no reduction in speed between their hallway movement and room entry. It is generally safer to conduct a deliberate room entry, including a complete threshold evaluation and clear communication as to who is number one and who is number two; however, under the following circumstances, it may be necessary to use a dynamic room entry:

- **Extremely narrow hallways where long cover is required** - If a hallway requires long cover but is too narrow to accommodate both the responder conducting the threshold evaluation and the responder providing long cover, then a dynamic entry into the closest room may be necessary.

- **Multiple open doors in close proximity** - If a contact team encounters multiple open doors that are so close together that responders attempting to conduct a threshold evaluation with long cover would end up exposed to additional danger areas in the subsequent rooms, then a dynamic entry is likely a safer option.

- **Explosive device in the hallway** (see Module 8)

- **Shots fired or active killing in a room with no visible suspect**

If possible, dynamic entries should be planned and communicated while the team is still a safe distance from the room to be entered, preferably from behind cover. However, if a contact team encounters a situation where a dynamic entry becomes immediately necessary, point can say, "Dynamic entry, all on me," then initiate the entry. This communication must be clear so that all team members will know to follow point into the room. Point should keep his or her speed at a medium walking pace, while the rest of the team moves as fast as necessary to stay close to the person in front of them. If point moves at full speed, he or she will likely create a gap between

team members, which will result in point entering the room alone while the rest of the team tries to catch up.

While the dynamic entry may be a safer option for the circumstances described above, it is an inherently dangerous technique, especially when performed by LE responders with limited tactical training. Dynamic entries result in a contact team entering a room blindly, with no prior intelligence and no cover or concealment. Responders may suddenly find themselves completely exposed to multiple danger areas and unknown individuals, all of which must be individually assessed to determine if they pose a deadly threat.

In contrast, an attacker inside the room will know exactly where the responders will make entry and can engage them without hesitation. Dynamic entries can also result in responders suddenly encountering the attacker at close range. While trained LE responders will generally have an advantage over active shooters in medium- to long-range gunfights, this advantage is lost at extremely close range. Even attackers with no firearms training can shoot at very close range, resulting in a devastating effect.

Responders should avoid making dynamic entry their go-to move when they feel stressed or rushed. Instead, they should consider threshold evaluation with long cover their go-to move. Responders should use the backup technique of dynamic entry only when they encounter specific conditions in which conducting a threshold evaluation would cause the team to be exposed to unusually high-risk factors, such as those listed above. *Law enforcement responders must realize and fully understand how dangerous dynamic entry is and should use this tactic only when no other better options exist.*

5.3 Closed and Locked Interior Doors

Closed Interior Doors (Inward-Opening)

Due to the prevalence of lockdown procedures in schools and other public buildings, it is possible that LE responders will be forced to deal with multiple closed and locked doors while searching for the attacker. Inward-opening wooden doors can usually be rammed or kicked open in an emergency, but heavy-duty, outward-opening doors with steel frames are a different story. When dealing with locked, heavy-duty, interior doors, responders should try to avoid using their body to breach the door because this approach can injure him or her. Ballistic breaching is an option in exigent circumstances where lives are in immediate danger, as discussed earlier.

In the absence of an active threat, locating a key is always an option when responding to a building under lockdown. Many schools with lockdown policies have a designated location in the office where spare keys are kept. Teachers and other employees may also be able to provide keys to LE responders as they evacuate the building. If a key cannot be located, then breaking a window may be the fastest option to gain entry.

To breach a locked, inward-opening door, point and long cover must move past the doorway while the other two responders remain on the near-side of the doorway. Long cover and rear guard maintain hallway coverage while the other two responders focus on the closed door. The responder

on the knob side of the door becomes the breacher. The responder on the hinge side of the door acts as room cover because he or she will get the first look into the room as the door opens.

Room cover (in blue on slides 5-22 through 5-26) keeps his or her head and gun up, ready to engage any threats that may appear from within the room, while the breacher (in yellow on slides 5-22 through 5-26) unlocks the door. The breacher may need to temporarily holster his or her weapon if both hands are needed to unlock the door.

Once the door is unlocked, the breacher sets the door by moving it just enough so the latch will not catch again, but not enough to reveal any of the room. The breacher then draws and raises his or her weapon, checks to make sure room cover is ready for the door to open, then pushes the door open with a foot. The breacher should try to avoid standing directly in front of the door while working to unlock and open it because attackers are more likely to fire rounds through a door than through a wall.

After the door is open, room cover and breacher become number one and number two, respectively, for the entry because they are standing on the opposing 45° positions. Numbers one and two should do a quick half threshold evaluation to visually clear the room, while being careful not to flag each other with their weapons. Following the visual clear, number one should initiate a coordinated room entry. Slides 5-22 through 5-26 show a four-person set up on an inward-opening closed door.



Slide 5-22: Approach to Locked or Closed Door



Slide 5-23: Long Cover Set



Slide 5-24: Door is Breached or Opened



Slide 5-25: Threshold Evaluation Conducted



Slide 5-26: Set Up for Room Entry

For a three-person contact team, the technique remains the same, but they must drop either rear guard (in white on slides 5-22 through 5-26) or long cover (in red on slides 5-22 through 5-26), depending on the direction of the least-perceived danger.

For a two-person contact team, both responders start on the knob side of the door. The responder closest to the wall acts as the breacher, and the responder closest to the hallway acts as room cover and long cover. Once the door is open, the breacher picks up room cover and conducts a threshold evaluation with long cover moving beside them (similar to the two-person open door technique).

A solo responder must perform the role of breacher (in white on slides 5-22 through 5-26), while also doing his or her best to scan for threats inside the room and down the hallway. Following the breach, the solo responder should conduct a threshold evaluation and make entry.

If an inward-opening door has a self-closing mechanism attached to it, then a traditional threshold evaluation will not be possible. In this case, there are a couple of options. One option is to ensure the team is ready to push into the room once the door is opened. Once the door opens, the team

should enter and must assess the room as they enter. The second option is for LE responders to push the door open and hold their positions, which allows responders to get a flash-site picture and assess the layout of the room while still outside. The responders will also be in a better position in the event of a worst-case situation. For example, the opening of the door may invite immediate gunfire from inside the room toward the contact team. The team will probably have more options to avoid being easy targets if they are positioned outside the room. On the other hand, if there is no gunfire, responders can make a quick plan on how to enter the room, open the door, and enter.

Closed Interior Doors (Outward-Opening)

Many public buildings are required by law to have outward-opening doors with self-closing mechanisms for all high-occupancy rooms. For this reason, LE responders should be prepared to encounter this type of door during an active shooter response.

To breach an outward-opening, self-closing door, the team splits and sets up on opposite sides of the door. The officer on the hinge side of the door will reach across, being careful to expose as little of his body across the door as possible. He or she will check the knob. If needed, and the officer has a key, they will unlock the door. The officer on the hinge side of the door will have his weapon at the ready to immediately cover the interior of the room as the door opens. When ready, the officers will communicate that they are both ready. The officer working the knob will rapidly pull the door open. Once the door is open, the breacher uses his or her foot or shoulder to keep the door from closing. The two responders standing closest to the doorway (in yellow and blue on slides 5-27 through 5-30) both conduct half threshold evaluations and prepare to make entry as number one and number two. To keep things simple and consistent, the responder who had the first look into the room should act as number one for the entry. If possible, LE responders should try to avoid “calling an audible,” or switching from number one to number two immediately before entering.

While having number one and number two start on specific sides of the door can provide a slight advantage upon entry for corner-fed rooms, the reality is that switching from number one to number two immediately before making entry often leads to confusion and delays at the threshold. This can create unnecessary risks to the contact team that could far outweigh any slight advantages they intended to gain by making the switch. In other words, responders who start as number one should remain number one through the entry. Slides 5-27 through 5-30 show a four-person set up on an outward-opening closed door.



Slide 5-27: Approaching Outward-Opening Door



Slide 5-28: Door is Breached or Opened



Slide 5-29: Threshold Evaluation



Slide 5-30: Set Up for Room Entry

5.4 Stairways

Law enforcement responders will likely encounter stairways any time they respond to an active shooter incident at a school or other large building. Stairways can be extremely dangerous for responders because they are a true 540° threat environment, with danger areas on all sides and at high and low angles. Additionally, if responders get into a firefight while ascending a stairway, there is little cover and concealment available to them, and the attacker has the advantage of occupying the high ground.

While there are several techniques for moving tactically through a stairway, the best option for ad hoc teams, with different levels of tactical training, is to keep things as simple as possible. When a contact team arrives at a stairway, instead of switching to another tactic, they can simply maintain the same movement technique they were using in the hallway and continue moving up the stairs. Responders may want to slightly adjust their positions in order to better cover high and low angles,

but their movement technique to ascend the stairway should be very similar to the technique they used to arrive at the stairway.

Prior to starting up the stairway, point should quickly look and listen for any threats directly above the team. If no threats are observed, point leads the team up the stairs and into a dynamic entry on the next floor. Point should move at deliberate speed, while the rest of the team moves quickly enough to remain close to point and ensure a simultaneous room entry onto the next floor.

While on the stairs, the team should move *quickly* and *quietly*, without stopping until they reach the next floor. *The best way to avoid getting ambushed on a stairway is to get off the stairway before the adversary knows you are there*. Stairways are not the place to move slowly, make plans, or have discussions about tactics.

Responders should do their best to maintain 540° security coverage but not slow down or stop their movement in an attempt to achieve "perfect" coverage of all possible angles. Slowing down or stopping in a stairway will greatly increase the team's vulnerability to attack. Below are some slight adjustments contact teams can make to improve their threat coverage in a stairwell without slowing down their movement speed.

Two-Person Tether

For a two-person tether, rear guard can move forward to be online with point to better cover point from high angle threats to the rear. Rear guard should be closer to the inside of the stairway, while point is closer to the outside of the stairway. Point covers all high and low angles to the front and sides, while rear guard covers all high and low angles to the rear and sides. Rear guard should keep his or her feet facing in the direction of travel, only turning the head as necessary to check his or her area of responsibility (see slide 5-31).



Slide 5-31: Stairway with Two-Person Tether

Three-Person Tether

For a three-person tether, rear guard can move up online with the other two responders to protect them from high angle threats to the rear (see slide 5-32).



Slide 5-32: Stairway with Three-Person Tether

Four-Person Diamond

For a four-person diamond, both right cover and left cover can move up online with point to protect point from high angle threats to the rear, while rear guard trails behind, protecting the team from low angle threats to the rear (see slide 5-33).



Slide 5-33: Stairway with Four-Person Diamond

If a contact team encounters a deadly threat while on a stairway, all the responders who can, should turn and engage the threat with overwhelming and accurate firepower. If the attacker retreats behind cover, the team should get off the stairway as quickly as possible, even if that means making entry onto the same floor occupied by the attacker. All team members should follow the point's lead.

5.5 Contingencies and Coordinated Distractions

The concepts and principles taught in Level 1 can be applied to a broad range of circumstances; however, each situation is unique. There will inevitably be instances when officers encounter problems that haven't been directly addressed or aren't exactly like the problems they experienced in training. One example is the closed, and presumably locked, doors of rooms 111 and 112 at Robb Elementary through which the suspect was firing at officers. Once this resistance was met, all offensive action ceased. It took over an hour for responders to create and implement a plan to end the incident.

When innocent persons are actively being attacked or critically injured victims are in need of medical attention, officers must continue to attack the problem. This isn't to say that they should move blindly forward with complete disregard for their lives and personal safety. Rather, they should quickly assess the situation and come up with a plan to overcome the resistance. In the case of a suspect who is in a position of tactical advantage, alternative entry points and/or coordinated distractions are two options.

Windows

Windows are often the best and easiest place to create an alternate breach point, distract the suspect's attention away from the primary breach point, or both. Breaching tools or improvised objects can be used to break the windows and pull-down blinds. If manpower allows, this is best accomplished by two officers working together. One provides cover while the other breaches the window(s).

Alternate Entry Points

Extreme situations necessitate outside the box thinking. If there are no secondary doors into the location, it may be necessary to create one or use damage as a distraction. Sheetrock walls can be easily breached with a sledgehammer or other improvised object. Most fire trucks have axes, pike poles, and chainsaws. The layout of the structure and the building materials will dictate the effectiveness of each option. The point here is to consider the alternatives that are immediately available and take action.

Noise as a Distraction

Anything that divides the suspect's attention or draws it away from the primary breach point helps to push the advantage back in law enforcement's favor. A siren or loudspeaker could help cover the sound of a contact team's approach to the breach point. Officers beating on walls or yelling can also serve to distract and confuse the suspect. Whatever distraction is used, it needs to be immediately available and quick to implement.

Coordinated Distractions

The effectiveness of the above alternatives is multiplied when they are implemented in a coordinated offensive. In this scenario, once teams are in place, a signal is given that initiates the action. Distractions commence, dividing the suspect's attention. Window teams work to clear the windows and gain a view into the room from outside if possible. At the same time, a breach/contact team breaches the primary entry door and floods the room.

The goal here isn't to formulate a perfect plan that eliminates all threats to officer safety. That kind of thinking will result in delay and inaction. General George S. Patton said, "Don't delay: The best is the enemy of the good. By this I mean that a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week. War is a very simple thing, and the determining characteristics are self-confidence, speed, and audacity. None of these things can ever be perfect, but they can be good."

Summary

In this module, participants received instruction on safely moving through hallways and setting up for room entries using several models. Safely negotiating stairways, dealing with interior doors, contingency plans, and coordinated distractions were also discussed.

For more information on the ALERRT program, please visit our website at
www.ALERRT.org

Module 6: Medical



Slide 6-1: Medical

Duration	60 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, the participants will be instructed on medical care. The participants will be shown the use of pressure points and tourniquet application for hemorrhage control as well as the use of recovery position for airway management. Additionally, participants will be taught the methods of casualty assessments. Participants will be able to perform each of the above-mentioned medical interventions and will become familiar with the acronyms frequently used in this module.
Terminal Learning Objective	Participants will be able to identify medical care guidelines and procedures and will be able to perform medical interventions.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 6.1 Understand when and where to use medical care 6.2 Recognize medical care guidelines 6.3 Establish an understanding of pressure points and tourniquet application for hemorrhage control 6.4 Demonstrate bleed sweep and basic triage 6.5 Perform recovery position and positional airway management 6.6 Identify penetrating chest wounds 6.7 Conduct casualty evacuation
Resources	• Instructor Guide • Student Guide • Tourniquets – 1 per student

Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size
Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	Not applicable
Assessment Strategy	Participant comprehension of module objectives will be evaluated as follows: • Observing participant behavior during practical application • Questioning to ensure that they understand how their performance will be evaluated • Soliciting input from participants to explain actions during each objective

6.1 Medical Care Guidelines

In this early response phase, medical care is limited to rapid trauma interventions that can be accomplished by the first responding officers and are aimed at simply stabilizing a casualty to facilitate a rapid casualty evacuation. Casualty care equipment is limited to what is carried by each responder. Threat mitigation will always take priority; however, these limited interventions may be applied if adequate security is established. The priorities are mitigating the threat, moving the wounded to cover or an area of relative safety, and managing arterial extremity bleeding, particularly with tourniquets. Rapid positional airway management may be considered if tactically feasible.

The following is a basic management plan for medical care:

- Return fire and take cover
- Direct the casualty to remain engaged if it is an officer
- Direct the casualty to move to cover and apply self-aid
- Try to keep the casualty from sustaining additional wounds
- Get yourself and the casualty off the "X" - have a plan prior to movement
- Stop life-threatening extremity bleeding if tactically feasible

Medical interventions are aimed at two leading causes of potential preventable death in a hostile environment: bleeding to death from an extremity wound and airway obstruction. This module will focus on:

1. Direct pressure and/or tourniquets (For self-aid: Casualty may hold pressure on a bleeding site or apply a tourniquet if one is available; however, for a first responder, bleeding control is best done through use of a tourniquet only. This is not the time/place for pressure dressing/holding pressure.)
2. Airway positioning through placing the unconscious casualty in a recovery position

Mitigate the Threat

Identifying the *driving force* and mitigating the threat should be a first responder's primary goal (*stop the killing*).

Move to a Safer Location

Once first responders have addressed the threat, they need to move to a safer position that affords more cover or concealment (get off the "X"). Pausing to administer casualty care treatment can result in poor tactics. Good medicine (meaning a traditional civilian approach that assumes the scene is safe for responders) equals poor tactics. Poor tactics will result in additional casualties or deaths. First responders should never provide definitive care on the "X." First responders must recognize that threats are dynamic and constantly changing, requiring constant threat assessments.

Communicate to Casualty

Communication is vital in assessing a casualty's ability to administer self-aid and in directing the casualty to move to a safe location. If the casualty can care for themselves, then they should apply self-aid as they were trained. If that casualty can function after applying self-aid, encourage them to stay engaged and in the fight.

Rescue Considerations

If a casualty is responsive but they are unable to move, a rescue plan should be established and executed. If a casualty is unresponsive, first responders must weigh the risks and benefits of an immediate rescue. Resource availability, manpower, and likelihood of success are some of the key considerations.

Tourniquet

If circumstances allow, first responders should attempt to stabilize a casualty experiencing massive bleeding. The status of the threat, severity of the bleeding, and distance to a safe extraction point will dictate the first responders' options. If the situation allows, considerations should be made to move to safety (first point of cover) before applying a tourniquet. First responders should direct the casualty to apply pressure to control the bleeding or apply a tourniquet if the casualty is able.

If the casualty is unable to apply a tourniquet themself, the rescuer should apply the tourniquet as high on the injured limb as possible, over clothing (but not routed over equipment or other hard objects) and tighten until the bleeding has stopped. Next, the first responders must move to safety. Following the movement, reassess the tourniquet to ensure that it has not moved, loosened, or slipped.

Recovery Position

Once the first responder and the casualty have moved to a safe location, the unconscious casualty can be placed in the recovery position to protect their airway. If the casualty is conscious, they may be placed in a position of comfort.

Effective Direct Pressure

Fast and Effective

One of the fastest and most effective methods to control bleeding is the precise application of direct pressure. This can be done by placing fingers directly into a severe wound, or by using a pressure point on the artery above a severe wound or directly on top of a superficial or shallow wound.

Transitional Technique

Direct pressure is a quick way to get control of a major bleed until medical adjuncts such as a tourniquet, wound packing, and/or bandaging materials can be readied for use and applied.

Exposing Artery Anatomy is Essential

One of the key elements for the effective application of direct pressure to a pressure point is to expose the arteries in the injured limbs to better access the proper location.

- Expose the brachial artery by positioning the upper arm near the casualty's head and rotating the palm up like the casualty is waving hello. This can be done while the casualty is sitting or lying supine.
- Expose the femoral artery by rotating the foot of the injured limb outward to gain access to the inner thigh.
- Further expose the femoral artery by bending the knee outward, which exposes the inner surface of the thigh providing even greater access to the artery.
- Once the artery is exposed, direct pressure to the pressure point can be applied to control bleeding until the appropriate adjunct can be applied.
- Direct pressure to the brachial pressure point can be applied by using a "C-clamp."
- Direct pressure to the brachial pressure point can also be applied using a knee if lying supine.
- Direct pressure to the femoral pressure point can be applied by using a knee if lying supine.
- Direct pressure to the femoral pressure point can also be applied by using the palm of the hand.

Precise Placement versus Amount of Pressure

Precise placement of pressure is more important than the amount of pressure that is applied. No amount of pressure applied in the wrong location will stop the bleeding. If properly placed, it will not take a tremendous amount of pressure to stop the flow of blood. The approach and positioning can assist in the effective precise placement of pressure.

- If the casualty is lying supine, approach from the feet to set up in the best position.
- Straddling the affected limb and using the inside knee to apply pressure, left knee for injuries to the left limbs and the right knee for injuries to right limbs, will place the knee in the best position to apply pressure to the exposed artery.

6.2 Extremity Tourniquet Application

Providing safe and valuable training to our nation's first responders is ALERRT's primary focus. A safely designed and appropriately applied tourniquet device can remain in place for up to two hours without causing permanent damage.

As we begin to train on the proper application of the tourniquet, we must address some training safety concerns. As we are in a training environment and wish to preserve the health and well-being of class participants, there are certain limitations on how the tourniquet will be applied in class.

If you have any of these conditions, you should not apply the tourniquet fully to yourself:

- Clotting or circulation abnormalities (including certain types of surgical procedure histories like blood vessel repairs or lymph node removal - this should only apply to a specific arm/leg)
- Pain syndromes
- Peripheral neuropathies

You should ensure the instructors and the class participants are aware of any conditions so that no tourniquets are applied with full force to you during any point of training. It is important for you to go through the mechanics of how to properly apply the tourniquet, but do not apply it fully where blood flow is impeded.

Primary Adjunct

Tourniquets are a fast and effective tool to stop major extremity bleeding when applied properly. Tourniquets are the primary adjunct used for treating massive bleeding caused by extremity wounds. It is extremely important for first responders to become proficient in their use. According to C-TECC, risks associated with tourniquets are a result of improper use, lack of training, improper devices used, or prolonged use. Tourniquets should never be considered as a last resort option for treatment.

Go High or Die

This is our preferred default approach during any phase of care. This means the tourniquet will be applied as high up on the affected limb as possible. Under the extreme stress and time sensitivity of this event, the need to stop the bleeding is of utmost importance. Placing the tourniquet high on the limb increases the chances of stopping blood flow and loss because of the single bone structure of the upper part of our arms and legs. Whether or not the severed artery has retracted, placing the tourniquet up high on the affected limb also increases the chances of clamping down on that artery upstream from where it is severed.

There are other tourniquet application techniques that are taught. Some programs teach to apply at least two inches above the injury (in the direction closer to the heart). Some teach to apply it two to four inches above the injury (in the direction closer to the heart). Others teach to apply it a few centimeters above the injury. Others describe it as placing the tourniquet proximal to the injury or proximal to the point of surgical amputation.

There are many arguments about placement, primarily centering around minimizing the amount and location of tissue damage created by applying a tourniquet itself. People almost want to fight

each other about how to teach where the tourniquet goes. Whether it is taught as "go high and tight," using inches or centimeters as a form of measurement, or is simply stated as placing it proximal, it all centers around the basic concept of placing it above the wound in order to stop life-threatening bleeding.

20 Seconds to Apply

With proper training, responders should be able to apply a tourniquet on themselves with their non-dominant hand in under 20 seconds. Responders should purchase a tourniquet to use for practice. Tourniquet drills should be part of law enforcement's firearms training. It is a perishable skill and needs to be practiced regularly.

Apply Directly Over Clothes

To ensure rapid application, the initial tourniquet should be applied high and directly over the clothing. Quickly check for and remove any objects, such as holsters or pocketknives, that could interfere with tourniquet application.

Determining Windlass Stopping Point

The windlass of the tourniquet should be turned until the bleeding stops.

Number of Tourniquets

It is not uncommon to use two or three tourniquets on one leg to stop bleeding. The leg is dense with muscle mass and often requires additional pressure applied to a greater surface area to completely collapse the artery.

Additional tourniquets should be applied directly adjacent to the last tourniquet applied. They should be placed as close as possible without overlapping. Once casualties have been moved to cover, an extra tourniquet should be added to exposed skin for wounds treated with a tourniquet over the clothes. A tourniquet applied over the clothes is likely to move and loosen during casualty movement. Applying a second tourniquet should not delay evacuation as long as the initial tourniquet is still effective.

Amputations

In the case of an amputation with or without bleeding, a tourniquet should be placed. If the extremity is not initially bleeding, it is likely to start bleeding as the blood vessels relax. Tourniquets should be placed right away.

Waiting Too Long and Not Applied When Needed

The most common mistake in tourniquet application is waiting too long to use the tourniquet. This is possibly a result of people still assuming the false idea that a tourniquet is a last resort. A tourniquet should be used immediately for casualties who have severe extremity bleeding.

Responders should not spend time trying to control the bleeding by other means. Any attempt at direct pressure should be for the sole purpose of slowing the bleeding while the tourniquet is applied.

Incorrect Location

Another common mistake is placing the tourniquet in an incorrect anatomic location. In an effort to follow the go high or die guideline, the tourniquet is sometimes placed so high that it goes over part of the shoulder or buttocks, making it difficult or impossible to adequately tighten. Tourniquets cannot work if placed directly over major joints. Tourniquets will also not work if they are placed on the incorrect side of the wound (correct location means between the wound and the heart).

Not Tight Enough

Failing to aggressively remove all slack from the tourniquet band before tightening the windlass can result in an ineffective tourniquet. The band is tight enough if it is difficult to slide three fingers between the band and the limb. Responders can also make the mistake of not tightening the tourniquet enough. When the tourniquet is only tightened enough to block venous bleeding, it ultimately leads to worse bleeding. If the tourniquet is tightened enough to stop the bleeding but not eliminate the distal pulse, the possibility of long-term damage is greatly increased.

Removed or Loosened Tourniquet

The tourniquet should never be loosened except by medical professionals. At one time, this was thought to decrease damage to the limb; however, this practice was shown to increase blood loss and potential for shock.

First responders should never attempt to remove a tourniquet. The best course of action is to continually reassess tourniquets to ensure the distal pulse is eliminated and apply additional tourniquets when necessary.

Law enforcement first responders should defer to medically trained personnel before removing a tourniquet. A safely designed tourniquet applied correctly can be safely left in place for approximately two hours without causing additional injury to the limb (data from combat use in relatively young, relatively healthy adults). The best course of action for law enforcement is to continually reassess tourniquets to ensure that bleeding has stopped and to apply additional tourniquets as needed.

Combat Application Tourniquet

The CAT tourniquet is the most widely utilized and effective tourniquet device. ALERRT uses this model as a primary casualty care adjunct in Level 1.

Nomenclature of the CAT Tourniquet

The CAT tourniquet consists of six primary parts. These parts are the windlass, windlass clip, windlass securing strap, circumferential band, buckle, and self-adhering band.

Recommended Storage Configuration:

- Fully extend the inner circumferential band and ensure that the windlass clip area is clean.
- Insert the tab of the band into the buckle (slit closest to windlass clip on Gen 6) and hold the tourniquet by the windlass clip.
- Pull the tip of the band to the bottom of the loop and mate the self-adhering band of the band below the buckle.
- Fold the tourniquet in half, self-adhering band to self-adhering band, and ensure the windlass securing strap is attached to one side of the windlass clip, not across the clip.

Recommended One-handed Application of the CAT

- Grab the tourniquet by the folded tab section and loop the tourniquet over the wounded arm.
- Pull the tab towards the midline of the body as tightly as possible (should only be able to fit 1-2 fingers easily between band and limb).
- Mate the self-adhering band on the tourniquet from the buckle to the windlass clip.
- Turn the windlass to apply pressure until the bleeding stops and secure it in the windlass clip.
- Secure the remaining self-adhering band inside windlass clip, over the windlass.
- Apply the windlass securing strap over the windlass clip and note the time, if possible.
- Check the need for additional tourniquets (still bleeding or distal pulse present).

Recommended Two-handed Application of the CAT (Gen 6 or 7)

- Grab the tourniquet and remove the band from the buckle.
- Route the tourniquet around the extremity and pass the band through the buckle.
- Pull the tab towards the midline of the body as tightly as possible (should only be able to fit one to two fingers easily between band and limb).
- Turn the windlass to apply pressure until the bleeding stops and secure it in the windlass clip.
- Apply the securing strap over the windlass clip.
- Check the need for additional tourniquets (still bleeding).
- Note the time, if possible.

With a tourniquet applied to a lower extremity, it may be possible to still stand, move, and stay in the fight. During training, it is recommended to sit down prior to releasing the tourniquet after walking. (It is possible for some people to experience lightheadedness when a lower extremity

tourniquet is released. We recommend sitting prior to releasing a lower extremity tourniquet during training iterations.)

6.3 The Recovery Position

Recovery Position

The recovery position helps to maintain an open airway for a semiconscious or unconscious casualty. This position helps the injured casualty breathe by keeping the tongue forward and permitting fluids to drain from the nose and throat, so they are not inhaled. First responders should not force conscious casualties into the recovery position but should allow them to assume a position of comfort that allows them to breathe. Conscious casualties with airway complications will generally position themselves in a manner that best facilitates their breathing. If they are unable to move freely due to injuries, the first responder may need to assist them into a position of comfort.

The recovery position also functions as an identifier to follow-on responders signifying that the casualty has been assessed by another team. This minimizes duplicate assessments and facilitates smooth movement as follow-on teams transition into the area.

Placing the Casualty in the Recovery Position:

- Kneel next to the casualty on their injured side.
- Extend the casualty's lower arm over the head, allowing the lower arm to rest on the floor.
- Lift the casualty's knee farthest from you, placing the leg into a bent position. This knee will act as a stopper when you roll the casualty onto their side, preventing the casualty from rolling completely over onto their stomach.
- Place one hand under the casualty's shoulder farthest from you. With your other hand, grasp the casualty's bent leg at the knee. Pull the casualty toward you. Their head should lie on their extended arm. Place the foot of the bent leg behind the knee of the straight leg.

- Bend the casualty's upper arm at the elbow and place the hand, palm down, between the casualty's head and shoulder. This will provide added support for the head.
- Tilt the casualty's head up slightly to open the airway and facilitate breathing and drainage of fluids. The casualty is now in the recovery position.

6.4 Bleeding Assessment and Triage

Reduced Threat Environment:

A casualty assessment and prioritization of casualties should be conducted to determine which casualties are to be evacuated in order of the severity of their injuries. Casualties should not be moved without a specific purpose. The following considerations should be made concerning moving a casualty:

- Moving casualties is labor intensive
- Movement is painful for the casualties
- Movement potentially compromises medical adjuncts that were applied to the casualty
- Movement requires reassessment of applied medical adjuncts

Perform a Rapid Casualty Assessment

Once the threat has been eliminated, or there is no longer a driving force, responders should quickly transition to stop the dying. As more officers and resources arrive, it becomes important to complete a rapid casualty assessment on each casualty to locate and treat life-threatening injuries, as well as triage to determine order of extraction. We won't cover a full assessment in the Level 1 course, but the casualty assessment method is **BATH** which focuses on **B**leeding, **A**irway management, **T**runcal injuries, and **H**ypothermia / **H**yperthermia. An additional assessment widely used in TECC is **MARCH**, which represents **M**assive bleeding, **A**irway, **R**espirations, **C**irculation, and **H**ypothermia. These processes are essentially equivalent and focus on the same areas of concern in the same order.

Patient assessment begins with a visual scan for massive bleeding. The most severe bleeding that can be controlled by a tourniquet is treated first. Bleeding from the head, neck, trunk, or pelvis is critical but requires more time and dedicates the officer to that one person. Meanwhile, in a mass casualty incident, others whose bleeding could be controlled by a tourniquet may die.

After the obvious massive extremity bleeding is controlled, a blood sweep of each casualty should be conducted to locate and identify major bleeds, such as exit wounds on the rest of the body. ALERRT advocates a rake technique to detect wounds. This is done with open palms and all fingers together and bent, much like the shape of a paw. First responders will use a raking motion over the entire casualty to locate penetrating trauma. Following each sweep, first responders may visually inspect their gloves for blood. If blood is discovered during a sweep, responders should locate the injury and address it if it appears to be a major arterial bleed. The initial sweep is performed while the casualty is clothed, but as wounds are located, the first responder should

remove enough clothing to expose the wound, depending on the intended medical intervention. Once the injury has been addressed, first responders should finish sweeping the remainder of the body.

The sweep may elicit a painful reaction over an injury location. Stop, inspect the area where the reaction was met, and treat any serious injuries accordingly. The proper sequence of conducting these sweeps is:

- Legs – belt to boot, front, sides, and back
- Neck – all sides
- Arms – starting from the armpit to the wrist
- Chest & Abdomen – front and both sides of the torso
  - Body armor must be loosened or removed unless considered as additional ballistic protection or used as a source of warmth
- Back – roll casualty onto their side and rake entire back
  - Recovery position (unconscious / semi-conscious)
  - Position of comfort (responsive and conscious)

Blood sweeps are conducted in this sequence based on the largest to smallest arteries that are more likely to create greater blood loss (order of lethality). The largest arteries are in the legs (femoral artery), then the neck (carotid artery), and finally the arms and armpit "shooters pocket" (brachial artery).

Once major bleeding is addressed, officers should address airway obstruction by placing unconscious or semi-conscious casualties in the recovery position. The remainder of the conditions covered in the BATH and MARCH acronyms are time intensive, and therefore should be reserved for later stages and/or medical personnel. Evacuation should be the highest priority.

Once blood sweeps are completed and controllable massive bleeds have been addressed, responders will need to identify which casualties need to be transported first. Obviously, persons with the most severe injuries should go first. There are numerous medical triage systems that can be utilized, but at this early stage of the incident, a quick decision needs to be made to avoid wasting too much time on a lengthy process. **Critically injured living** casualties, which can be identified by severe core body injuries (from the head to the groin) or persons unable to follow simple commands need to be evacuated first. **Seriously injured living** casualties such as persons with massive but controlled bleeding should be transported next. Obviously deceased persons, or persons not breathing after a positional airway adjustment, should not be transported over those prior categories. Finally, uninjured persons should not be evacuated during this early phase so that all efforts can be directed toward the injured.

During and/or directly after the bleeding sweeps and management, airway management and rapid triage, first responders should determine the need for a casualty collection point (CCP) and their ability to establish one. A casualty collection point is a geographic location where casualties are consolidated for further treatment and evacuation prioritization. Given the extent of the damage inflicted and the number of sustained casualties, there may be more than one CCP required at a

scene. As previously mentioned, moving a casualty may cause applied medical adjuncts to move or shift, rendering them ineffective. First responders should vigilantly reassess all medical adjuncts applied to a casualty after they are moved to confirm that they are functioning properly.

6.5 Positional Airway Management

Position of Comfort

In most circumstances, a conscious casualty will try to position themselves in a position of comfort without help. In other cases, the casualty may need assistance to obtain a position of comfort. First responders should pay close attention to the casualty and actively listen to them to fully understand what they are trying to convey. Ask the casualty what you can do for them to make them more comfortable. The casualty may react aggressively due to pain and shock, but do what you can to improve a bad situation. By assisting the casualty into a position of comfort, first responders may be able to alleviate pressure on a wound, minimizing additional pain for the casualty.

Sit Up and Lean Forward (Conscious)

Conscious casualties having trouble breathing will naturally place themselves in a position that makes their breathing process the easiest. As mentioned, listen closely to the casualty, and do not try to make them lie down if they are trying to sit up or if they express breathing difficulty in other positions. The casualty is naturally trying to save themselves and it is important to understand the message they are sending. Frequently, they will sit up and lean forward, making their breathing easier.

The Recovery Position

Unconscious and semi-conscious casualties are placed in the recovery position to aid in protecting their airway. The recovery position allows bodily fluids to drain from the casualty's mouth and their tongue to relax so as not to obstruct their airway. During indirect threat care, first responders may be afforded more time to assess the casualty's airway and the quality of the respiratory effort.

What Are Some Signs of Respiratory Distress?

First responders must be able to identify signs of respiratory distress exhibited by a casualty. Some indicators of respiratory distress are:

Appearance

Appearance is a general impression or observed state of a casualty. First responders can visually identify signs of respiratory distress from a distance, like scanning a room. The exception is if the casualty is not breathing or has limited breathing. In this case, hands-on assessments must be made. A casualty's appearance will often exhibit indicators of their overall condition, such as:

- *Pale skin* indicates lack of blood flow and oxygen to the tissue. Look for inadequate breathing and bleeding.
- *Blue skin* indicates lack of oxygen to the tissue. Look for inadequate breathing and bleeding.
- *Rapid breathing* indicates lack of oxygen, like what occurs after running, or it may be due to blood loss. It can also indicate hyperventilation or an altered mental state. Keep the casualty calm and check for blood loss.
- *Slow breathing* could indicate that the casualty's condition is deteriorating, and immediate medical support is necessary.
- *Irregular breathing* indicates a potential brain injury and requires immediate medical support.

Breathing Effort

Immediate medical attention is necessary if:

- The casualty is working extremely hard to breathe
- The casualty's neck muscles have expanded
- The casualty is sitting upright with their hands on their knees in a tripod position
- The casualty is using abdominal muscles to breathe

Incomplete Sentences

A casualty unable to speak in complete sentences indicates respiratory distress. First responders should identify this indicator and evaluate the casualty to determine the cause.

Audible Noises

Casualties may make unusual sounds if they are experiencing respiratory distress. Some sounds might be high pitched wheezing, gurgling, raspy, or coughing. These indicators qualify the need for immediate medical support. Because treatment options will be limited for first responders, casualties experiencing respiratory distress should be classified as a priority for immediate transport.

6.6 Penetrating Chest Injury

High Priority Evacuation

Penetrating chest injury, or truncal injury, is lethal and extremely challenging to stabilize or treat in the field. These injuries are between the casualty's chin and their pelvis, making this a non-compressible injury. First responders will be extremely limited with treatment options for casualties with penetrating chest injuries. The extent of medical care involves controlling external bleeding, keeping the airway open, and facilitating priority evacuation.

Although treatable options for penetrating chest injuries are limited in the field, first responders can prioritize casualties based on the extent and point of injury. Directing your attention and effort towards treating casualties who are bleeding, stabilizing them, and then focusing on evacuating your most critically injured will be challenging but necessary.

The most recent literature review of U.S. civilian pre-hospital trauma deaths emphasized the historical fact that bleeding from noncompressible torso trauma results in approximately 20-45% of potentially preventable deaths annually. This represents somewhere between 20,000-67,500 deaths per year. These casualties die before or shortly after reaching a hospital due to complications from the untreated severe blood loss.

6.7 Casualty Evacuation

There are four major models of casualty care and evacuation currently being used across the United States: Law Enforcement Rescue, protected island, protected corridor, and escorted warm zone (also known as Rescue Task Force). In this course, we will spend a considerable amount of time discussing, setting up, and working the Law Enforcement Rescue approach; however, this is not meant to imply that this model is always the best approach.

The Protected Corridor Model

Law enforcement responders create a secured pathway within a structure and remain at key locations (e.g., intersections, exits, elevators) along this pathway. EMS and fire personnel operate freely within this corridor to provide indirect threat care and evacuate casualties.

The Protected Island Model

Law enforcement responders create a secured CCP within the attack location, and EMS and fire personnel provide indirect threat care to the casualties in the CCP. Law enforcement is responsible for bringing casualties from unsecured areas to the protected island. A protected corridor or escorted warm zone is generally used to evacuate casualties from the attack location.

Escorted Warm Zone Care or Rescue Task Force Model

Escorted warm zone care, or Rescue Task Force, pairs law enforcement with EMS and fire personnel to create a task force. Law enforcement responders provide security and EMS, and fire personnel provide indirect threat care and transport casualties for evacuation. This task force can operate anywhere in the warm zone.

The Law Enforcement Rescue Model

Law enforcement responders are the only ones who operate in any warm zones. After responders have stopped the active killing, officers must turn their attention to stopping the dying. Law enforcement officers provide indirect threat care to casualties and transport the casualties out of the warm zone. Ideally, law enforcement responders should transport the casualties to the cold

zone where waiting EMS and fire personnel provide additional care, triage, and transport to definitive care. However, if EMS or fire resources are not available, law enforcement can transport directly to definitive care.

Each model has been successfully used to provide casualty care and evacuation during attacks. Because this is a law enforcement only class, we are going to focus on the Law Enforcement Rescue model. Rescue models other than the LE model are outside the scope of this class and are discussed at length in the ALERRT *Active Attack Integrated Response* class.

Evacuating the Wounded

Responders may be required to carry injured casualties to the CCP or the evacuation point. Responders should take a few seconds to plan an efficient means of moving a wounded person, instead of just grabbing and going. Responders should try to move the casualties safely, relatively quickly, and as easily as possible on both responders and casualties. To move casualties who absolutely cannot walk, responders should use a litter if they have one. If they don't have a litter, responders should look for other ways to move the casualties, such as rolling chairs, bed sheets, or large pieces of wood. Often, the only means available to move casualties will be to carry them.

While emergency responders and military personnel use many effective techniques to carry wounded individuals, in order to reduce the risk of injury to course participants, the techniques listed below are the only techniques that will be permitted during the ALERRT Level 1 scenarios.

The One-Person Drag

The one-person drag is a very simple and quick method to move a casualty a short distance and is applicable in solo officer response and/or when working in pairs wherein one officer acts as a cover officer while the other drags. It consists of a responder grabbing the wrist of a non-ambulatory person and simply pulling them from a danger area into a more protected space such as a CCP. This is also a good technique to get a casualty off the "X" where they sustained the injury into a safer area. This technique is intended for very short distances wherein no other option exists. Keep in mind, this technique works well on smooth surfaces such as tile but may be a little more difficult on surfaces like carpet. As with all casualty movement techniques, care should be used during training to avoid responder and role player injuries.

One-Person Drag

The One-Person Carry

The one-person carry method is another useful method for a single officer to move non-ambulatory casualties, wherein it would be difficult and/or not beneficial to drag them due to the nature of the injury, surface, or distance.

The responder approaches and lifts the casualty's shoulders until they are in a seated position, then crosses the casualty's hands in front of them. The responder then stands behind the casualty, squats down low, places their chest to the casualty's back, reaches under the casualty's armpits, and grabs the casualty's opposite wrists. The responder pulls the casualty's wrists back until the responder feels pressure against their chest. The responder lifts the casualty using their legs, not their backs.

One-Person Carry

The Two-Person Assist

The two-person assist method is useful for quickly moving casualties who are conscious and have use of at least one of their legs. To use the two-person assist, one responder stands on each side of the casualty and places one of the casualty's arms over each responders' neck and shoulders. Each responder holds the casualty's wrist on his or her shoulder with the outside hand and grabs the casualty's belt or back of the pants with his or her inside hand. If the person being assisted goes unconscious, the responders can use their outside hand to sweep under the person's legs, enabling them to carry the unconscious person in a seated position.

Two-Person Assist

The Two-Person Carry

The two-person carry method is useful for moving casualties who are unconscious or do not have use of their legs. The first step is to lay the casualty on their back with the legs straight. One of the casualty's legs is then placed on top of the other leg. One responder grabs the casualty's bottom pant leg cuff at the ankle with one hand and holds it like they would a suitcase handle. If the casualty is not wearing pants, responders should grab the bottom of the ankles and travel in the same direction towards the feet.

The other responder lifts the casualty's shoulders until they are in a seated position, then crosses the casualty's hands in front of them. The responder then stands behind the casualty, squats down low, places their chest to the casualty's back, reaches under the casualty's armpits, and grabs the casualty's opposite wrists. The responder pulls the casualty's wrists back until the responder feels pressure against their chest. On the count of three, both responders simultaneously lift the casualty. Responders should be sure to lift with their legs, not their backs.

The responder carrying the casualty's body must be sure to get a good grip on the casualty's wrists (not shirt sleeves) and must keep the casualty's arms pulled back, so the arms don't raise up above the casualty's head. The responder must also be sure to grab the casualty's opposite wrists (i.e., the responder's right hand grabs the casualty's left wrist, while the responder's left hand grabs the

casualty's right wrist). Grabbing the same wrists works fine on conscious people who have enough upper body strength, but on unconscious casualties or those with little upper body strength, grabbing the same wrists will not allow the responder to adequately support the casualty's weight, which may result in shoulder injury to the casualty.

Two-Person Carry

Summary

In this module, participants were instructed on medical care. The participants were shown the use of pressure points and tourniquet application for hemorrhage control as well as the use of recovery position for airway management. Additionally, participants were taught the methods of casualty assessments.

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www.ALERRT.org

Module 7: SIM (Security, Incident Command, Medical)

Slide 7-1: SIM (Security, Incident Command, Medical)

Duration	60 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, participants will receive instruction on identifying and prioritizing the critical tasks that must be accomplished immediately after all known threats have been neutralized in order to quickly and safely transition from stopping the killing to stopping the dying. Responders will learn to establish security, address initial incident command responsibilities, provide immediate medical care, and create a safe corridor in order to evacuate the wounded to a location where they can be treated by EMS personnel and transported to a trauma center as quickly as possible. Instruction will be conducted in a practical exercise area utilizing plastic training handguns and training tourniquets.
Terminal Learning Objective	Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to identify and properly prioritize the critical tasks that must be accomplished during the stop the dying phase of an active shooter response by utilizing the SIM acronym (security, incident command, medical).
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 7.1 Demonstrate how to quickly and effectively establish a secure area where critically injured victims can receive immediate life-saving treatment in a safe environment 7.2 Identify the key incident command tasks that must be completed within the first few minutes of an attack in order to save as many lives as possible

Resources	● Plastic training handguns (1 per student) ● Combat Application Tourniquet (CAT) training tourniquet (1 per student) ● Special Operations Forces Tactical Tourniquet (SOFT-T) training tourniquets (2 total for familiarization) ● Wallet-sized Active Shooter Response Card (1 per student) ● Red training handguns (1 per instructor) ● ALERRT Instructor Key Cards
Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size
Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	This module will be taught to the class as one large group. The instructors will explain and demonstrate each new skill. At the end of the module, students will be divided into groups and practice as a team. This module should be taught in a secure location with a large room that can accommodate the entire class. If possible, the large room should be near a long, wide hallway.
Assessment Strategy	● Observing participant behavior during exercises ● Questioning participants to ensure comprehension of module objectives ● Soliciting input from participants to explain actions during each objective

Security, Incident Command, Medical (SIM)

Immediately after neutralizing all known threats (stop the killing), responders should transition their efforts to saving the lives of the injured (stop the dying), while ensuring that no one else gets injured either from unknown threats, or as the result of a blue-on-blue incident. Responders may decide to enter the stop the dying phase of the response, either because they just neutralized the only known attacker(s), or because they have completed a quick, cursory search of the scene and no attackers were found. Either way, this phase must be initiated as quickly as possible if the lives of critically injured victims are to be saved.

LE responders often feel an urge to continue clearing rooms until the entire structure is secure. This may occupy their time and attention for several minutes or hours, preventing them from treating the critically wounded in a timely manner. To ensure this doesn't happen, LE responders must continuously ask themselves if they are seeing or hearing additional evidence of active killing. As soon as the answer is "no," they should immediately stop clearing and shift their focus to the stop the dying phase.

The stop the dying phase of a response can be chaotic and extremely stressful for responders. They may have just been involved in a gunfight for their lives and may now find themselves surrounded by several concerns that demand their immediate attention such as downed attackers, seriously injured victims, uninjured victims (possibly including concealed attackers), and additional uncleared danger areas.

If they are not careful, LE responders can rush into making lethal mistakes, or waste crucial seconds trying to decide what to do next. Law enforcement responders can quickly identify and prioritize the most critical tasks that must be accomplished during the stop the dying phase of an active shooter response by using the acronym SIM (security, incident command, medical).

7.1 Security

Security refers to establishing a secure area where the critically injured can receive immediate lifesaving treatment. This initial secure area may consist of only one room at first but will grow as additional responders arrive, until it includes the entire area where victims are located. If injured victims are located in areas that are difficult to secure, they may be moved to a casualty collection point. SIM is not a sequential process. Items may be completed simultaneously if the situation and manpower allow. The following list of tasks will help responders quickly transform a chaotic environment into a secure area:

1. **Cover the attacker(s)**: Assign a responder to keep his or her attention focused on each known attacker, ready to apply additional deadly force if necessary.

2. **Consolidate and vet unknown individuals**: When a contact team is surrounded by unknown individuals, every member of the team must keep his or her attention on the people in their sector of fire, which leaves nobody available to start working on other critical tasks (such as treating the critically wounded). In order to free up responders, the team should issue commands to all unknowns in order to get their hands visible and

consolidate them in one area of the room. If there are only a few unknowns, they can be instructed to lie prone on the floor. However, if there are numerous unknowns present, the team will get a better view of all of them if they are instructed to kneel (or sit) side by side facing a wall. For most people, holding their hands up above their head becomes tiring very quickly, resulting in hands starting to come down, which can be interpreted by LE responders as noncompliance. To avoid this problem, it is recommended that the unknowns place their hands on their heads, with fingers interlaced. This makes it easier for compliant unknowns to remain motionless and easier for LE responders to keep an eye on everyone's hands. As the unknowns are being moved to the consolidated location, a responder should ask a responsible-looking individual if there are any additional attackers, IEDs, or other hazards. Once the unknowns have been consolidated and vetted, they can be covered by just one or two responders, enabling the rest of the team to move on to other critical tasks.

3. **Handcuff the attacker**: Have one responder cover the subject with his or her weapon, while another places the handcuffs.

4. **Cover the entrance**: Assign a responder to cover the entrance to the room and close all other doors leading into the room. The responder at the entrance needs to complete the following tasks:
   - Mark the room. For example, place a chair with a garbage can on top of it in the hallway in front of the room.
   - Communicate with external incident command and provide the team's location, status, and needs for additional resources. It is especially important to notify command of the location of any IEDs (or other hazards), as well as the number of injured victims and their types of injuries.
   - Ensure a positive linkup with follow-on responders. As LE responders enter an active shooter attack site, they may be affected by tunnel vision and auditory exclusion due to stress. If the first encounter they have with another team is seeing a head and a gun pointing at them, the chances of a blue-on-blue incident are high. On the other hand, the chances of a blue-on-blue incident are significantly reduced if LE responders take a few simple steps to ensure a safe linkup between teams. Linkup should start before the LE responder even knows another team is approaching. The responder in the doorway should regularly yell "Police!" or "Blue! Blue! Blue!" down the hallway so that follow-on teams will hear this verbal communication and have time to process its meaning before they set eyes on the responder at the doorway. When the follow-on team hears this verbal communication, they should establish verbal and visual contact. When the responder in the doorway believes that another team is about to make visual contact, he or she should conceal his or her head and weapon inside the room and display a visual sign in the hallway (e.g., an open hand, a thumbs up, or flashing a light). Once the other team has acknowledged the visual sign (e.g., "I see your hand"), then the responder in the doorway can make visual contact and wave the follow-on team into the secure area.
   - Provide instructions to follow-on teams. To ensure clear communication, the LE responder in the doorway should instruct follow-on teams to come to him or her and

enter the secure area, where instructions can be given face to face, instead of attempting to yell instructions down a long hallway. The follow-on team can be asked to assist with security and/or medical inside the secure area if needed. If additional assistance inside the secure area is not needed, the follow-on responders should be assigned to start creating a secure corridor in preparation for evacuating the wounded.

- Designate a casualty collection point (CCP) and direct the creation of a secure corridor for evacuating the wounded. If there is no need for a CCP due to the small number of injured, then move immediately into the evacuation phase.

- Communicate to the rest of the team if additional shots, or other signs of active killing, are heard. If the responder at the doorway hears signs of active killing, he or she must communicate this to the rest of the team. If another follow-on contact team has already arrived at the secure area, that team can be sent to eliminate the threat. However, if only the original contact team is present and these normally consist of one or two officers, they must immediately stop what they are doing and transition back into stop the killing mode by ensuring that any known attackers in the room are disarmed, handcuffed, and then reestablishing their contact team and moving out toward the signs of active killing. This depends totally on the size of the contact team and the circumstances present. This will end up being a call the team makes in the moment. Smaller teams may not be able to multitask, but a larger number of officers may be able to leave a responder in the room while the rest leave. While leaving injured and unarmed victims behind is difficult, LE responders must remember that stopping the killing is the most effective way they can save lives and must be their first priority. Taking the entire contact team to engage the threat will provide the best chance of delivering overwhelming firepower and quickly neutralizing the attacker, which will enable the focus to return to stopping the dying as quickly as possible. Once active killing has ceased, effective security of the immediate area can be maintained by only a few responders, freeing up others to focus on treating and evacuating the wounded.

7.2 Incident Command

After responders have stopped the killing and initial security has been established, they need to quickly move on to the next two stages of SIM: incident command and medical. Responders should work on updating and establishing incident command and medical *simultaneously*. This means the initial LCAN report must be updated to reflect the new information and conditions.

At least one responder needs to address certain critical incident command matters while other team members are treating the wounded. This person will likely be the responder standing at the doorway. Establishing incident command early on during an active shooter response enables coordination between all available responders (police, fire, and EMS). This coordinated effort maximizes the efficient use of all available resources to accomplish the common goals of stopping the killing and stopping the dying.

Ideally, incident command will be established as the first LE responder arrives on-scene, provides dispatch with a brief LCAN size-up report, and assumes command. However, sometimes this is

difficult because the first LE responder to arrive on-scene may find themself immediately involved in a gunfight. Surviving and winning the gunfight should always take priority over considering incident command matters. As soon as immediate threats have been neutralized, LE responders need to ensure that the following information has been communicated to dispatch:

- Identify yourself
- Assume command: "I am in command."
- Provide your location
- Provide critical information regarding attackers (how many, location, description, weapons, IEDs, and other hazards)
- Provide critical information regarding victims (how many, location, type of injuries)
- Request additional responders and give instructions on where they are needed
- Indicate what you plan to do next

As mentioned in Module 2, the FBI and ALERRT have produced a wallet-sized card called an *Active Shooter Response Card* (see slide 7-2 and slide 7-3). This card contains a simple checklist of critical tasks that must be addressed within the first few minutes of an active shooter incident in order to save as many lives as possible. Eventually, supervisors will arrive on-scene to take over incident command and formalize the command post; however, even in large cities, this may not happen right away. Waiting for supervisors to arrive before addressing certain critical incident command tasks will likely result in additional lives being lost. Every LE responder, even those recently hired, should carry the Active Shooter Response Card with them at all times. They should be prepared to assume command and start completing the tasks listed on the card within the first few minutes.



Slide 7-2: Active Shooter Response Card (Front)



Slide 7-3: Active Shooter Response Card (Back)

7.3 Immediate Action Plan

Whoever has assumed IC and has been talking on the radio needs to position themselves in the threshold of the threat area the team is working out of and maintain command. While giving the status update, IC will also become aware of any other responders arriving on scene or working inside the crisis site. IC should also become aware of any other information that may necessitate a contact team to form up and move to another location. While things are relatively calm, IC should communicate a plan to all officers in the room or immediate area should an emergency erupt elsewhere.

This is called an immediate action plan. It should be simple and easy to understand. This plan covers who does what in the event of shots fired or other active violence occurring somewhere other than their immediate location. The immediate action plan helps to minimize confusion among teammates if the situation dictates that the team must suspend what they are doing and move to another location to stop the injuring of innocent persons. The KISS principle (keep it simple, stupid) applies here. There is no need to develop a complicated plan. A simple statement like, “If shots are fired, you stay, we will go” works best.

An immediate action plan should consider the totality of the circumstances as they are perceived at the time. For example, if there are known to be other first responders moving inside the crisis site, the initial first responders already in the threat area may not want to leave the location they are working. They may elect to set up a blocking position in a hallway and allow other responders to move to the second crisis point. Another issue that may come up is: if there are minimal first responders, who goes? Who stays? Can both go? Under exigent circumstances, textbook solutions may not fit the reality one is facing. It is okay to leave where you are standing unattended, if you do not possess the resources to hold that location and move to another active attack location.

7.4 Medical

The medical interventions covered in Module 6 will be utilized. Medical should be started as soon as possible. Establishing a CCP is not an automatic necessity. Officers should be mindful that each time a victim is moved, their survivability decreases, so the need for a CCP should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Its necessity will depend on the number of victims, their locations, size of the scene, continuing threats, etc. This *stop the dying* phase is really a misnomer. Medical interventions utilized by officers are not stopping the dying, they are merely delaying it. True life saving measures only happen at a hospital; therefore, it’s important to evacuate the victims quickly.

7.5 Solo Considerations

The solo responder does not have a partner to provide cover, so they must maintain a security mindset until backup arrives. While 99% of active shooter incidents are carried out by only one shooter, it is critical that the solo responder be prepared for the 1% where there is a second shooter.

Additionally, what initially may appear to be a single-shooter incident might actually be the beginning of a multi-shooter terrorist attack, gang activity, robbery, etc. After securing the room, the decision to holster, or not, is up to the solo responder, but they should consider the potential consequences if they are holstered and the attacker becomes active again, or another attacker enters the room. For those officers who prefer to keep their weapon out until backup arrives, they should consider keeping it at the Sul position, as Sul is a non-threatening, widely recognized law enforcement carry position. While maintaining a security mindset, the solo responder can simultaneously accomplish the following important tasks:

- Ask key questions to occupants of the room: Is this the only shooter? Who has medical training? Who has a cell phone? (call 911, put on speakerphone)
- Safely move the attacker's weapon to a secure location but, if possible, wait for backup to arrive before holstering to clear the weapon. Avoid doing anything that might inadvertently cause the subject's weapon to go off (kicking it, jamming it into your waistband or pocket, etc.). A solo officer can keep their eyes on potential threats and their weapon in their strong hand, while they use their support hand to pick up the subject's weapon and carefully move it to a location where they can set it down and ensure no one else touches it until backup arrives to properly clear it.
- If an officer feels secure enough to holster their weapon and begin providing medical aid, even alone, they should have that option. Research supports that 99% of the time there is one attacker. It takes less than one second to re-draw their weapon if a new threat materializes. We never want a police officer standing with a gun in their hand watching a victim bleed out because he was told if he is alone, he always needs to have his gun in his hand.
- If not in uniform, as soon as practical, put on high-vis law enforcement markings (i.e. police banner). Plainclothes officers with their weapons out can easily be mistaken for a hostile threat by follow-on responders.
- Continue to verbally identify yourself as law enforcement (approximately every 10 seconds), so follow-on responders will hear you before they see you. When uniformed officers arrive, be sure your weapon is at the Sul position, or holstered, and continue to verbally identify yourself as LE while following all their commands.

7.6 Secure Corridor

Rapid evacuation of the victims should be the overriding goal at this phase of the incident; however, it must be done in a safe and coordinated way. Officers should look for an exit that will allow for easy transfer to an ambulance or vehicle. Once the exit is selected, security needs to be considered. The complexity of the security will depend on the situation and continued threat level. Many times, teams will get bogged down with trying to search every room between the CCP and the evacuation point. This unnecessarily delays victim evacuation. Searching additional rooms is only necessary if it is believed there may be additional victims or a known suspect who has not yet been located. In schools, the rooms will likely be locked with students inside.

Corridor security may be either mobile or stationary. Mobile security would be an armed officer escorting others as they move a victim to the exit. This is a good option for incidents involving a small number of victims, where the attack site is deep within a large building, or when short on manpower. Posting stationary officers at doorways, intersections, and potential threat areas provides an enhanced level of security. It is more time and manpower intensive. It may be used in situations involving a large number of victims, short evacuation corridors, or when there is a continued high threat such as an unlocated suspect.

Security should also be established at the exchange point (XP). This is the exterior location where victims will be loaded into ambulances or other vehicles. Two to four officers will generally be sufficient, but more may be needed depending on the location.

Once the exit is designated and security worked out, the final step prior to victim evacuation is to coordinate having transport at the CEP prior to movement. Unless fire, IEDs, or some other threat exists that necessitates immediate evacuation, victims should only be moved outside if there is a place waiting to receive them. Otherwise, they are better off waiting where they are. Coordinating transport will involve having an exterior incident command post and having staging established. Module 10 will focus on ICS and the early establishment of these critical components.

Summary

In this module, participants were introduced to the second stage of a proper response: stopping the dying. The SIM process was explained and its importance in managing an active attacker event was stressed. Concepts such as CCPs and preparing the injured for evacuation were discussed. Though this course focuses on the Law Enforcement Rescue model, other models in use across the country were presented.

For more information on the ALERRT program, please visit our website at
www.ALERRT.org

Module 8: Improvised Explosive Devices

Slide 8-1: Improvised Explosive Devices

Duration	45 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, participants will receive instruction on recognizing when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are deployed against them by an attacker and how to react appropriately. Instruction will be conducted in a practical exercise area utilizing plastic training handguns and inert training IEDs.
Terminal Learning Objective	Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to recognize when IEDs are deployed against them and react in a manner that minimizes the potential for injury to LE responders, while allowing responders to continue to stop the killing and stop the dying.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 8.1 Demonstrate how to appropriately react if their contact team encounters a stationary IED in their path 8.2 Demonstrate how to appropriately react if a hand-deployed explosive device is thrown at their contact team
Resources	• Plastic training handguns (1 per instructor and participant) • ALERRT Instructor Key Cards • Small, inert training IEDs (3 per instructor) • Large, stationary inert training IEDs (3 total)
Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size

Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	The demonstration/explanation phase of this module will be conducted in a group setting with all participants.
Assessment Strategy	• Observing participant behavior during exercises • Questioning participants to ensure comprehension of module objectives • Soliciting input from participants to explain actions during each objective

8.1 Stationary IEDs

Attackers have used IEDs in numerous active shooter incidents, not only to injure civilians, but also to slow down and injure the first LE responders. Improvised explosive devices are extremely dangerous and can be very complex in their design and triggering mechanisms.

ALERRT Level 1 is not a bomb technician course and does not provide training adequate enough to prepare LE responders to safely disarm, deactivate, or otherwise handle explosive devices. Intentionally handling explosive devices should only be attempted by properly trained and equipped bomb technicians.

Unfortunately, properly trained and equipped bomb technicians will probably not be present when the first LE responders arrive at an active shooter incident that involves IEDs. The purpose of this module is to provide LE responders with basic information about the dangers of IEDs and how best to avoid being injured by them, while still taking immediate action to stop the killing and stop the dying.

When responding to an incident involving IEDs, if there is no evidence of active killing or active dying (i.e., critically injured victims in need of immediate medical treatment), LE responders should treat the situation as they would a hostage/barricade situation, with the added step of requesting bomb technicians to respond to the scene (see Module 2). On the other hand, if signs of active killing or active dying are present, LE responders must immediately take action to stop the killing and stop the dying, while also minimizing their own risk of becoming incapacitated by any IEDs.

Improvised Explosive Device versus Firearm-Only Attacks

While all active shooter incidents are inherently dangerous, the addition of IEDs significantly increases the danger faced by LE responders. This is due to the fact that an IED has the potential to instantaneously incapacitate an entire contact team. For this reason, contact teams must use a different technique when they encounter an IED than they would when they encounter an attacker armed only with a firearm.

When a contact team encounters an attacker armed only with a firearm, they should use effective teamwork, overwhelming and accurate firepower, and aggressive movement to neutralize the attacker immediately. In other words, instead of breaking off the firefight to seek hard cover, the team should rely on overwhelming and accurate firepower as their primary protection from incoming rounds. Even if a responder is hit, the rest of the team pushes on until the threat is neutralized, giving the attacker no time or opportunity to escape and kill additional people.

In contrast, because an IED detonation could potentially incapacitate an entire contact team, LE responders who encounter an IED should immediately seek cover. If an attacker is able to use an IED to incapacitate an entire contact team, he or she will be free to continue killing innocent people until another contact team arrives on scene.

Four Important Rules for IEDs

There are four rules that will help LE responders protect themselves from the devastating effects of an IED, while still enabling them to accomplish their mission of stopping the killing and stopping the dying.

Don't Touch the Bomb and Bomber

Improvised explosive devices can be triggered by numerous means, including burning fuses, timers, light, movement, pressure, heat, trip wires, and electronic signals. Some devices have multiple triggering mechanisms, so LE responders should never assume the device is safe simply because one triggering mechanism has been deactivated. Burning fuses can also be deceptive because the invisible inner core of the fuse may be burning several inches ahead of the visible flame. While it is important to not touch the device, it is not necessary to turn off a radio or cell phone. A high volume of electronic signals constantly passes through the air at any given moment; therefore, if a device is sensitive enough to be triggered by an LE responder's cell phone or radio, it would likely have detonated long before the responder arrived. Turning off communication devices while near an IED is unnecessary and will reduce effective communication between LE responders.

Treat the bomber just like a bomb—don't touch him or her. It should be assumed that once attackers deploy explosive devices, they may have additional live explosive devices on their person that can be triggered even if they are deceased. The simple act of handcuffing a deceased attacker may be enough to trigger an IED. Instead, LE responders should control the attacker by keeping their weapons pointed at him or her from behind cover at a safe distance. Responders should be prepared to use additional (including lethal) force as necessary if the attacker continues to pose a deadly threat.

Create Distance and Angles

The bad news is that when an IED detonates, it generates a supersonic blast wave that can cause devastating internal injuries to anyone in close proximity. This blast wave is magnified in confined spaces, can penetrate walls, and can follow hallways for a significant distance.

The good news is that blast wave pressure dramatically reduces with distance and 90-degree turns. Responders can use this information to make quick, life-saving decisions when they encounter an IED. For example, an LE responder who sees an IED 10 feet away in the same hallway and immediately drops flat on the ground before the device detonates may still be killed by the blast wave. However, if the responder quickly moves back a few more feet and ducks around a corner before detonation instead of dropping to the ground, he or she may receive little or no injury from the blast wave.

In addition to the blast wave, IEDs can launch thousands of pieces of shrapnel that often travel at speeds faster than most bullets. Taking cover around one (or more) 90-degree corner(s) is the best way to reduce the potential for injury from shrapnel. As soon as an IED is observed, LE responders should notify their team, immediately create distance between themselves and the device, and move around at least one 90-degree corner. *Remember, if you can see it, it can hurt you.*

Mark and Communicate the IED's Location

After taking cover, the contact team should inform command of the location and description of the IED. The team should also clearly mark the general area with something highly visible (while making sure to not touch the device). Some agencies use red and blue chemical lights taped together to indicate the location of an IED. If chemical lights are not available, the contact team can use items on hand, such as upside-down chairs, garbage cans, or anything else that will cause follow-on teams to slow down and use extra caution in the area.

Find an Alternate Route

After marking the device's location, the contact team should consider that area to be off-limits and find an alternate route to get to the attacker's location. The team should not assume they can safely move past a device simply by not touching it or carefully stepping over a trip wire. The device may have additional triggering mechanisms such as an internal timer, or it may be command detonated by an electronic signal from the attacker just as the contact team is attempting to move past it.

Some alternate routes are easy to identify, such as going in the other direction around a square hallway configuration. Other alternate routes may require thinking outside the box, such as using internal connecting doorways instead of the main hallway or exiting through a window to move outside and then reentering through another door or window.

Shots Fired

If, after observing a stationary IED and moving back to cover, a contact team hears shots fired or other signs of active killing, they must continue moving toward the threat. If an alternate route is immediately available, they should take the alternate route. If no alternate route is immediately available, they will have to carefully bypass the stationary IED.

If a team has to bypass a stationary IED, they should look carefully for trip wires or other obvious triggers. The contact team should ensure that every team member has seen the IED, trip wire, or both for themselves before approaching it. This will reduce the chances of a team member inadvertently triggering the device while bypassing it. If a trip wire is spotted and bypassing the device is necessary, one responder should stand guard at the trip wire and help each member to carefully step over the wire. After bypassing the stationary IED, the first one or two LE responders should quickly find and eliminate the threat. Remaining LE responders create distance and angles, cordon off the IED, and warn follow-on responders.

As soon as the threat is eliminated, a responder should ensure the device is effectively cordoned off and then continue to warn follow-on teams. The team should contact available resources for help with the IED and evacuate the affected area. Just because the team safely moved past an IED once does not mean it is no longer dangerous. An alternate route that avoids the area near the IED should be located and used for bringing in follow-on responders and evacuating the wounded.

8.2 Hand-Deployed Explosive Devices

Hand-deployed explosive devices, such as pipe bombs and hand grenades, are typically smaller than stationary IEDs. However, they can be even more dangerous because the attacker can throw them directly at the contact team. When an explosive device is thrown at a contact team, the first person to see the device must make a quick decision about whether it is better for the team to 1) stop, turn around, and move back the way they came to find cover, or 2) keep moving forward past the device then take cover.

If the device comes to rest several feet in front of the team, then turning around and moving back to find cover is the best option. On the other hand, if the device lands extremely close or among the contact team, then the best option is to keep moving forward and take cover beyond the device. Either way, the team needs to act quickly and decisively in order to take cover before the device detonates.

Bomb Cover and Bomb Go

The first LE responder to see the device or bomb should communicate his or her decision to the rest of the contact team by yelling either "bomb cover" (if they want the team to turn around and move back to find cover) or "bomb go" (if they want the team to move forward to find cover). This communication needs to be done loudly and clearly.

Even if the communication is loud and clear, some team members may not be able to decipher whether *bomb cover* or *bomb go* was said due to the effects of stress (e.g., tunnel vision or auditory exclusion). However, the entire contact team will likely notice if one member starts yelling and suddenly pushes everyone back into a room or starts yelling and quickly moves forward and enters a room. Therefore, the best option is for LE responders to simply follow the lead of the first LE responder who yelled "bomb."

As LE responders quickly exit a hallway to take cover from an explosive device, they should remember to move tactically into a room or other hallway, while making sure to check the hard corners for potential threats. This is a situation where a dynamic entry (with no threshold evaluation) is recommended.

Once the device detonates, LE responders should not rush back into the hallway. The attacker may have thrown more than one device, and the second device may detonate just as the contact team reenters the hallway. Instead of rushing back into the hallway after an explosion, the contact team should position one or two people to watch the doorway or hallway (in case the attacker used the bomb to initiate an assault) while the others follow the steps for a stationary device: communicating the device's location to command, marking the hallway, and searching for an alternate route to the attacker.

If, while taking cover to avoid a bomb blast, individual LE responders become separated from their team, they should remain in verbal contact and quickly and cautiously rejoin the rest of the team as soon as it is safe to do so. Once the team is reunited, they should reenter the same hallway where a device was deployed *only if absolutely necessary* (e.g., they hear signs of active killing down the hallway and there is no other alternate route immediately available).

A bomb go call may require a team to move past a device and enter the same room occupied by the attacker. If this occurs, the team should move aggressively into the room, physically forcing the attacker out of the way, if necessary, while simultaneously engaging the attacker with deadly force. The team *cannot* stop in the hallway to shoot the attacker. They must get inside the room before the bomb in the hallway detonates.

Evacuation

In an IED environment, even after all attackers have been neutralized, the scene is not safe and will likely not be safe until hours later when bomb technicians complete their final sweep. Unfortunately, LE responders cannot wait that long to evacuate the critically wounded without risking loss of life.

Law enforcement responders should carefully plan a secure corridor for medical evacuation and ensure the corridor is as far as possible from areas believed to contain IEDs (whether already detonated or not). Some EMS policies require that their personnel remain a certain distance from an IED scene; therefore, it is important to choose a casualty collection point that is far enough away to allow EMS personnel to access it. This will help ensure evacuees receive advanced medical care and immediate transportation to a trauma center as needed.

Summary

In this module, both stationary and hand-held IEDs were discussed. Countermeasures that mitigate the effects of these IEDs were introduced.

For more information on the ALERRT program, please visit our website at
www.ALERRT.org

Module 9: Force-on-Force Scenarios

Slide 9-1: Force-on-Force Scenarios

Duration	3 hours 30 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, students will go through multiple scenario-based practical exercises that provide them with the opportunity to practice the active shooter response skills they have learned during this course. Marking cartridges and blank rounds will be used to increase students' stress level. This will (to a minor degree) simulate the stress they may experience during an actual active shooter response. During the scenarios, students will wear protective masks for their safety and to further simulate the effects of stress on the human body (such as tunnel vision and auditory exclusion). Instructors will manage the scenarios to ensure safety, provide guidance, and offer feedback.
Terminal Learning Objective	Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to control the physiological effects of stress and effectively apply the active shooter response skills they have learned during this course under a variety of different circumstances, including force-on-force marking cartridge training.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 9.1 Work effectively as a small team to successfully complete multiple small active shooter scenarios

Resources	● Marking cartridge training handguns (Kit includes 20. Number used will depend on class size.) ● Marking cartridge magazines (2 per handgun) ● Marking cartridge training masks with throat protectors (1 per student) ● CAT training tourniquets (1 per student) ● Blue instructor masks and yellow vests (4 total, 1 per instructor) ● Marking cartridge ammunition (1000 rounds, 300 red and 700 blue) ● ALERRT Instructor Key Cards ● Two-way radios ● Metal detector (1) ● Police marking tape (1 roll) ● Duct tape (1 roll) ● Marking cartridge training hazard signs (10)
Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size
Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	Students will complete four small scenarios using marking cartridge training weapons and protective masks.
Assessment Strategy	● Observing participant behavior during exercises ● Questioning participants to ensure comprehension of module objectives ● Soliciting input from participants to explain actions during each objective

Scenario-Based Practical Exercises

Safety

To ensure that accidents do not occur, it is essential that LE responders adhere to certain basic firearm safety rules during both training and actual responses. The exact verbiage for these rules varies slightly from agency to agency, but the core concepts are the same.

Basic Firearm Safety Rules

1. Treat all firearms as if they are loaded
2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless you intend to press it
3. Never point a firearm at anyone unless you are justified
4. Be sure of your intended target's foreground, backstop, and beyond (arc of fire)

During ALERRT Level 1, marking cartridge training weapons will be used. Marking cartridge weapons fire a plastic bullet filled with colored soap. While these weapons are much safer to train with than live weapons, they are still capable of inflicting serious injury. For this reason, the safety rules listed above and below will be strictly enforced during all marking cartridge training scenarios.

Marking Cartridge Safety Rules

1. Absolutely no live weapons or ammunition are allowed in the designated marking cartridge training area.
2. Keep your mask and throat protector on until instructed to take them off by an instructor.
3. Always remain within the designated marking cartridge training area while armed with a marking cartridge training weapon.
4. If you see anyone inside the marking cartridge training area without a mask on, or any other serious safety violation, immediately stop what you are doing and notify an instructor.
5. Absolutely no horseplay. Treat marking cartridge weapons the same as you would a live weapon. Keep your finger off the trigger and don't point it at anyone unless you encounter an adversarial role player during a training scenario, at which time you may (and should) engage the subject until he or she no longer poses a deadly threat. Do not shoot role players at extremely close range (arm's length). Do not continue shooting role players after they no longer pose a threat.
6. Do not fire at instructors. Instructors will be clearly marked with colored masks and reflective vests.

General Rules

Follow All Instructions Exactly

Students will act as role players for some scenarios and as LE responders for other scenarios. The purpose of using student role players in the scenarios is to provide participants additional opportunities to observe and learn. Student role players will be expected to exactly follow all instructions provided by instructors and will be removed from the scenario if they fail to do so. That means if an instructor tells a student role player to fire two rounds, then fall down as if immobile, but instead the student engages in a lengthy gunfight with the contact team, that student role player will be required to leave the training area and potentially not receive credit for the course. Each scenario is designed to accomplish specific learning objectives. When student role players do not follow instructions exactly, the objectives are often not accomplished—which is a disservice to the other students in the class.

Keep Your Mask on Until Instructed to Remove It

Students will be required to wear marking cartridge training masks and throat protectors during the small scenarios. Marking cartridge rounds can cause blindness and other serious injuries; therefore, students must put their masks on when instructed to do so and keep them on until instructed to remove them. Marking cartridge masks have a tendency to fog up, especially if the student is not actively controlling his or her stress level. Sometimes students will comment that their masks prevent them from seeing or hearing critical elements during the scenarios. Usually, it is not the mask but the students' accelerated respiratory rate that drastically reduces situational awareness. This reduction in awareness is often due to the physiological effects of stress such as tunnel vision and auditory exclusion. The small scenarios are a good time for participants to practice managing the physiological effects of stress by taking slow, deep breaths and pausing for a few seconds before inhaling and exhaling. Students who force themselves to visually scan the entire environment will also reduce the negative effects of stress. Participants who notice that their mask is fogging up should remember to take slow, deep breaths and scan their environment more.

Stay in the Fight Until the Threat is Eliminated

During the scenarios, participants should not quit or "die" even if they are shot in the face mask. Responders do not train to die or quit. Participants should stay in the fight and complete their objectives, no matter what happens during the scenario. They should train like they fight and fight like they train.

Do Not Harm Role Players

Participants should not use aggressive hands-on techniques with the role players. This is not a ground fighting school. All scenarios can be completed without using aggressive hands-on techniques. If a situation does arise where an aggressive hands-on technique would be warranted, students should tell a nearby instructor what they would do under the circumstances, and the instructor will adjust the scenario accordingly. Students should not harm the role players. Simulate

handcuffing only by crossing the person's hands and advising an instructor that he or she has been handcuffed.

Handling of Real-World Medical Incidents

In case of a real-world medical incident, students should immediately stop what they are doing and inform an instructor that a real-world medical situation exists. The instructor will have everyone holster and then remove their masks in order to deal with the medical situation according to the medical brief.

9.1 Small-Team Scenarios: Marking Cartridges

This module will take up the entire morning of Day 2. Prior to this module, all students will be checked three times (once by a fellow student, once by an instructor, and again by an instructor with a magnetometer) to ensure that no live weapons or ammunition enter the training area. Any individual who leaves the training area during this block will be searched again by an instructor before re-entering the training area. The following items are also prohibited in the training area:

- Large fixed-blade knives
- Chemical spray
- Tasers
- Batons

For the small scenarios, the class will be divided into four teams. The four teams will rotate through the small scenarios according to the scenario rotation chart.

Summary

Participants worked in small teams to complete various active shooter scenarios. Firearm and marking cartridge safety rules that apply to both training and real-life situations were emphasized. Participants practiced incident command skills and had the opportunity to use their Active Shooter Response Cards.

For more information on the ALERRT program, please visit our website at
www.ALERRT.org

Module 10: Incident Command System

Slide 10-1: Incident Command System

Duration	40 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, participants will be guided by an instructor as they are introduced to the concept of an Incident Command System (ICS). The instructor will explain the concept of incident command from the first LE responder on-scene through the larger elements of a protracted response.
Terminal Learning Objective	Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to explain and describe the ICS as it relates to an active shooter response, including the first responding officer's duties to initiate the system and take command. Students will also learn the follow-on steps involved in setting up the ICS.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 10.1 Describe the first LE responder's duties of initiating ICS and taking command 10.2 Describe the transition of command from first officer to exterior
Resources	● Wallet-sized Active Shooter Response Card (1 per student) ● ALERRT Instructor Key Cards
Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size
Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	This module will consist of instructor lecture and walk-through focused on active attack incident command. ICS will start with the first officer on scene taking command and issuing an LCAN and grow outward as resources and manpower become available. The importance of establishing command early on cannot be overstated.

Assessment Strategy	● Observing participant behavior during exercises ● Questioning participants to ensure comprehension of module objectives ● Soliciting input from participants to explain actions during each objective

Slide 10-1: Incident Command System Video

10.1 The Blue Tsunami

As the first officers are arriving on scene to stop the killing, a second disaster – a tsunami – is approaching the attack location. It is a "blue tsunami" composed of all the law enforcement officers within radio range rushing to the attack site to help stop the killing. If this wave is allowed to hit in an uncontrolled fashion, it can swamp the attack site and hinder the ability of responders to save lives. It must be controlled if we are going to save as many lives as possible.

Over the past two decades since the attack at Columbine High School, law enforcement training has focused on rapid response. Officers are taught to respond directly to the scene, self-deploy, and immediately work to neutralize the threat. It has become so ingrained in police culture that an active shooter call is the one incident that every officer rushes to, regardless of their agency, assignment, or on/off duty status. Literally everyone in the region with a badge is responding to this event. While this kind of response is desirable in the first few minutes to stop the killing, if left unchecked, it will lead to over convergence, confusion, and delay. Never was this more tragically apparent than during the 2022 incident at Robb Elementary in the rural town of Uvalde, Texas. Despite the presence of 376 law enforcement officers on the scene, including a chief, commanders, multiple supervisors, and SWAT team members, the failure to establish effective incident command resulted in an unprecedented breakdown in the law enforcement response.

Taming the Wave

So, how can law enforcement coordinate their efforts? The answer is the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS). The Incident Command System has been in use by our fire service partners since the 1970s. Originally called FIRESCOPE, it was designed to facilitate coordination between all responders regardless of agency, discipline, or level of government. In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security released the National Incident Management System as the national standard for ICS.

There is no need for law enforcement to reinvent the wheel. The NIMS/ICS system is time-tested and proven to be effective in tens of thousands of real-world incidents. Embracing the ICS model and making it a part of everyday police operations represents the most needed training and cultural shift in law enforcement active attack response since the first active shooter response classes following the Columbine High School tragedy.

10.2 Building the ICS Structure

First Officer

Active Attack Incident Command begins with the initial responding officer. This officer holds the most advantageous position for both providing and gathering mission-critical information and coordinating the response at the crisis site. It is recommended that the first officer take command via the radio as they enter, so that all initial responders are working together in a coordinated fashion and listening to the responder who has the most timely and accurate intelligence. In most law enforcement agencies, it is recognized that the first officer on any scene is in charge of that scene, or in essence, an Incident Commander of that call until relieved of command by a more experienced or ranked officer. Considering the size, complexity, and rapid expansion of active attack incidents, it is very beneficial to announce this intent officially and verbally so that incident control and management is established as early as possible.

Another key task for the first officer is to conduct a comprehensive assessment, commonly referred to as a size-up, of the incident. A size-up provides a concise overview of the situation for all responding units. The goal is to provide effective communication and coordination during emergencies like this. Most importantly, it offers a snapshot that helps paint a picture of the current situation and observations as an officer arrives on the scene, so they can take the appropriate action. The size-up should be reported twice – first upon the officer's arrival on the scene, and second, just before making entry into the crisis site. This is crucial as the fluidity of the incident may have changed during this timeframe.

ALERRT uses the acronym LCAN to give a size-up report. Standing for **L**ocation, **C**onditions, **A**ctions, and **N**eeds, the LCAN report shapes the approach of subsequent officers as they arrive on scene. We emphasize that the first arriving officer will assume command by announcing it over the radio. There's no expectation for this officer to stop and establish a formal command post. Instead, they operate as mobile command, moving quickly to stop the killing and ensure safety.

Here is an example of an officer giving a size-up using the LCAN acronym:

Location: Unit 107 is on scene at Van Buren Elementary School.

Conditions: I see teachers and children screaming and running out of the building.

Actions: I am making entry through the front door of the school, on the Alpha side of the building, by the flagpole. A teacher states there is a shooter in the library.

Needs: I need follow-on officers to link up with me. Unit 107 will have *COMMAND.*

The first arriving officer's priorities are:

- Size-up - LCAN
- Establish Incident Command (IC)
- Move directly to the threat.
- Neutralize the threat.

Taking charge from the outset and furnishing information through an LCAN report significantly enhances the initial response. Nevertheless, as officers advance towards the attack location, the capacity to manage the overall incident dwindles by the minute, if not the second. The incident commander's attention will be absorbed by what is in their immediate vicinity, particularly if they encounter victims or engage in a deadly force encounter with the perpetrator. To accomplish the next objective of stopping the dying, the wounded must be quickly evacuated to a hospital. On-site medical interventions merely delay death. The solution to stopping the dying lies in providing patients with access to definitive care. Command and the officers inside the crisis zone are tasked with numerous responsibilities. Stopping the dying requires a switched-on officer to acknowledge and recognize that no additional officers are needed inside the crisis site. This individual will have a broader perspective of the situation and will be less deeply involved in the immediate chaos going on inside the crisis site. This role will involve assuming command away from the crisis site, i.e., the parking lot, and facilitating the allocation of appropriate resources to those inside the hot zone.

First Transfer of Command

Every incident is unique; therefore, it is difficult to put an exact number of on-scene officers or a timeframe on when the first transfer of command should occur. Considering that roughly 98% of the incidents involve a single suspect, who the first arriving officers are quickly and aggressively moving to neutralize, it is likely that the stop the killing phase of the incident will be over within minutes. In events wherein the suspect is not neutralized quickly, as in the case of the incident at Robb Elementary in Uvalde, Texas, then the process of establishing overall incident command becomes even more critical. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the initial arriving officer, even acting as the first Incident Commander (IC) within the crisis site, to wrangle, direct, and deploy all the various arriving resources. Therefore, command should be transferred to a less involved responder outside the immediate crisis site who would possess the bandwidth and situational awareness to be able to properly control the event. How and when this transfer happens can be event-specific, but every agency should have a general procedure for the development of an expanding and effective incident command structure.

10.3 Policy, Training, and Culture

Decades of data and over 500 incidents have shown that law enforcement over convergence and ineffective command and control is a problem at every active attack scene. It can therefore be anticipated and mitigated. Departments should adopt or modify active shooter policies to require the above steps be followed. They should train their officers and supervisors on ICS and make it a part of their everyday operations and culture.

10.4 Putting it All Together

1. The first officer on scene should gain situational awareness, give an LCAN report, assume command, and move to stop the killing.
2. As each subsequent officer arrives, they must assess where they are needed most. If multiple officers are already on scene, they should strongly consider stopping and assuming command if it hasn't already been done. If not established in the first few minutes, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to gain control.
3. Departments and supervisors should seek additional training on ICS operations and make ICS a part of their everyday operations.

Adoption of ICS into the everyday operations and culture of law enforcement represents the most needed training and cultural change in the past two decades. It will be slow, difficult, and met with resistance. It is nevertheless needed if we are going to save as many lives as possible.

Summary

In this section, participants were made aware of the problems caused by over convergence of officers at the attack location. The steps involved in establishing and maintaining ICS were explained, including taking command, providing an LCAN report, and transfer of command. Finally, agencies were encouraged to seek additional ICS training and update policies to require ICS practices be followed.

Module 11: Extended Scenarios

Slide 11-1: Extended Scenarios

Duration	2 hours 30 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, students will go through multiple scenario-based practical exercises designed to build ICS skills. The SSO will use blank rounds to simulate gunfire. Students will have plastic training pistols. No marking weapons will be used. This is done to lower the stress level slightly and eliminate the need for protective masks, which enhances the student's ability to communicate. Instructors will manage the scenarios to ensure safety, provide guidance, and offer feedback.
Terminal Learning Objective	Upon completion of this module, participants will be able to demonstrate when and how to effectively implement ICS at an active attack scene.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 11.1 Work effectively as a large team to successfully complete multiple large active shooter scenarios, including establishing incident command, staging, and coordinating a rapid casualty evacuation.
Resources	• Marking cartridge training handgun and magazine (used to fire blank rounds) • CAT training tourniquets (1 per student) • Inert training IEDs (1 stationary, 1 hand-held) • Yellow vests (4 total, 1 per instructor) • Blank ammunition (500 rounds) • Safety glasses – 1 pair per participant / instructor • ALERRT Instructor Key Cards • Police identification sash – 1 per responder • Two-way radios – 1 per responder if available

	● Command and Staging vests ● Green Strobe with power adapter
Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size
Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	Students will complete multiple extended scenarios, focusing on early establishment of ICS – command, command post, and staging.
Assessment Strategy	● Observing participant behavior during exercises ● Questioning participants to ensure comprehension of module objectives ● Soliciting input from participants to explain actions during each objective

Scenario-Based Practical Exercises

Safety

To ensure that accidents do not occur, it is essential that LE responders adhere to certain basic firearm safety rules during both training and actual responses. The exact verbiage for these rules varies slightly from agency to agency, but the core concepts are the same.

Basic Firearm Safety Rules

1. Treat all firearms as if they are loaded
2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless you intend to press it
3. Never point a firearm at anyone unless you are justified
4. Be sure of your intended target's foreground, backstop, and beyond (arc of fire)

General Rules

Follow All Instructions Exactly

Students will act as role players for some scenarios and as LE responders for other scenarios. The purpose of using student role players in the scenarios is to provide participants additional opportunities to observe and learn. Student role players will be expected to exactly follow all instructions provided by instructors and will be removed from the scenario if they fail to do so. Each scenario is designed to accomplish specific learning objectives. When student role players do not follow instructions exactly, the objectives are often not accomplished—which is a disservice to the other students in the class.

Do Not Harm Role Players

Participants should not use aggressive hands-on techniques with the role players. This is not a ground fighting school. All scenarios can be completed without using aggressive hands-on techniques. If a situation does arise where an aggressive hands-on technique would be warranted, students should tell a nearby instructor what they would do under the circumstances, and the instructor will adjust the scenario accordingly. Students should not harm the role players. Simulate handcuffing only by crossing the person's hands and advising an instructor that he or she has been handcuffed.

Handling of Real-World Medical Incidents

In case of a real-world medical incident, students should immediately stop what they are doing and inform an instructor that a real-world medical situation exists. The instructor will have everyone holster and then remove their masks in order to deal with the medical situation according to the medical brief.

11.1 Extended Team Scenarios

This module will take place during the afternoon of Day 2. Prior to this module, all students will be checked three times (once by a fellow student, once by an instructor, and again by an instructor with a magnetometer) to ensure that no live weapons or ammunition (either live or marking cartridges) enter the training area. Any individual who leaves the training area during this block will be searched again by an instructor before re-entering the training area. The following items are also prohibited in the training area:

- Large fixed-blade knives
- Chemical spray
- Tasers
- Batons

For the extended-team scenarios, the class will be divided into two groups. One group will act as role players, and the other group will be the LE responders. A much larger training area will be used for the extended-team scenarios, so every responder will be needed. For the extended scenarios, both role players and responders will use plastic training pistols.

Summary

Participants worked in large teams to complete various active shooter scenarios. Firearm safety rules that apply to both training and real-life situations were emphasized. Participants practiced incident command skills and had the opportunity to use their Active Shooter Response Cards.

Module 12: Course Wrap-Up, Post-Test, Evaluation

Slide 12-1: Course Wrap-Up, Post-Test, Evaluation

Duration	30 minutes
Module Overview	In this module, participants will complete a post-test covering the objectives of the course. Participants will also complete a Course Evaluation Form.
Terminal Learning Objective	At the end of this module, participants will complete a comprehensive post-test and course evaluation.
Enabling Learning Objectives	At the conclusion of this module, participants will be able to: 12.1 Discuss learning objectives and overall course content 12.2 Provide feedback by completing a Course Evaluation Form 12.3 Complete a comprehensive post-test successfully

Resources	• Instructor Guide
	• Internet access – Wi-Fi, hot spot, or individual cellular connectivity
	• ALERRT online course management platform or mobile app
	• One per participant of the following items:
	  ○ Participant Guide
	  ○ Smart phone, tablet, or laptop

Instructor to Participant Ratio	Ratios may vary depending on class size
Reference List	Not applicable
Practical Exercise Statement	Not applicable
Assessment Strategy	• Completion of a Course Evaluation Form • Instructor administration of a post-test to assess the knowledge participants gained from each module

12.1 Course Evaluation



Slide 12-2: Course Evaluation

The ALERRT program at Texas State University would like to obtain participant feedback about this course. ALERRT recognizes the importance of participant suggestions and observations to sustain high-quality instruction and identify areas for improvement. For these reasons, ALERRT asks each participant to complete a Course Evaluation Form.

In addition to obtaining participant feedback through the course evaluation forms, ALERRT conducts outcome studies. In the future, participants may receive an email or phone call from a member of the ALERRT team inquiring about how participants have used the knowledge, skills, and abilities they have gained from this course.

12.2 Post-Test



Slide 12-3: Post-Test

The post-test provides participants with an opportunity to demonstrate mastery of the terminal learning objectives. Participants' post-test scores will be used to measure the course's benefit and identify the knowledge and skills participants have gained from their attendance. 80% or above is considered a passing score. Retests may be administered onsite if needed.

For more information on the ALERRT program, please visit our website at
www.ALERRT.org

Appendix A

Required Reading

Additional Information

- What Happens Under Stress?
- Force-on-Force Practical Scenario Safety Briefing

What Happens Under Stress?

For the purposes of this course, we can view the brain as having two basic systems. These systems are the X and C systems. **X** comes from refle**X**ive and **C** comes from refle**C**tive. As the names imply, the X system responds automatically, whereas the C responds contemplatively. The X system also corresponds to older more primitive brain structures (think reptile brain or emotional brain), whereas the C system corresponds to more modern brain structures (think human brain or rational brain). All animals have an X system. Humans have the most developed C system of any animal.

When information is received from one of the senses, it is split into two streams. One feeds into the C system and one into the X system. One of the advantages of the X system is that it is fast. The drawback to this speed is that it is limited in its responses to a set of preprogrammed actions. The X system is also effortless. There is no need to think when the X system is controlling something; it just happens.

When we are conscious about what is occurring, we are using the C system. The big advantage of the C system is that it is flexible. It is the C system that allows us to learn, weigh options, and develop plans. This flexibility comes at the cost of speed. When it comes to reaction time, the C system is several orders of magnitude slower than the X system. It also takes effort to engage the C system, and the C system also does not function well under stress.

In the context of a violent encounter or other threat, our brain has a series of alarm systems that activate to prepare us to deal with the threat. The fastest of these are the least discriminating and easiest to trigger. A loud noise, for example, may activate our startle reflex (which might cause us to flinch). If the loud noise was not a threat, this reflex action is wasted, but in cases where the noise is a threat, the startle reflex starts the process of getting us ready to act. As the series of alarms are activated, more and more of our body's resources are focused on the threat. Heart rate, breathing, and blood flow to the large muscles all increase to prepare us to act physically. The machinery of the brain increasingly focuses on the threat. The immune system also ramps up in preparation for injury. These physiological changes allow us to use our body's machinery to its fullest extent during times of crisis to physically respond to a single threat. The changes make us faster, stronger, and more focused.

This process is largely under the control of the X system. As a matter of fact, the further down the stress response trail one moves, the more impaired the C system becomes. As stress mounts, the ability to think decreases. Given enough stress, everyone becomes stupid. Their C systems shut down. At high levels of stress, people can only utilize actions that are preprogrammed into the X system. For many people, these actions are limited to fighting, fleeing, or freezing. You may also experience several common sensory side effects when under high stress. These include:

- **Tunnel vision**: Your field of focus may narrow to only the most immediate threat and you may not see peripheral details.
- **Audio exclusion**: You may stop hearing what is happening.
- **Time dilation**: Things may seem to move in slow motion or fast motion.
- ***Out of body* experiences**: You may feel as if you are outside your body watching the event happen.
- **Reduced motor skills**: You may experience reduced efficiency of your fine motor skills.

These are all side effects of your stress response system preparing your body to deal with a threat. These X system responses to threats developed during a time when a man's most likely threat was going to come from a single source that needed to be dealt with physically and immediately. For example, a tiger jumps out of the bushes in front of an early human. The human needs to either fight it or flee. The threat environment faced by police officers today is often much more complicated. Officers might face situations where they are confronted with multiple armed suspects and innocents. They may need to perform fine motor activities, like shooting, in order to survive. The primitive stress responses may interfere with the officer's ability to see the multiple threats or perform the needed fine motor activities. While the X system has uses, the C system is needed in many of the dangerous situations that a police officer will face on the job. The following sections discuss how to keep the C system functioning longer and how to prepare to act when the C system is compromised.

Keep the C System Functioning Longer

Use Willpower

Willpower can be simply described as using the C system to override the X system. In the case of a violent encounter, the X system is setting off a variety of panic alarms. By exerting willpower, a person is trying to get the C system to actively override these alarms. This can be done, but it takes conscious effort. Willpower is also a limited resource. Willpower can prevent or delay some stress responses, but eventually it will fail. The use of combat breathing is a tool that can help utilize willpower. Combat breathing consists of breathing through the nose for a three count, holding the breath for a two count, breathing out for a three count, and then pausing for a two count before beginning the next breath. The use of this technique has been shown to lower people's heart rates dramatically for a short period of time and can help to circumvent some of the X system alarms.

Take Care of Yourself

Research has shown that people who are more physically fit are also generally more able to cope with stress. Part of this gain may be due to a fit person's regulatory system being better able to deal with the physiological swings caused by stress, and part of it may be due to willpower. Most people do not like to get up in the morning and go workout. The act of exercising requires a use of willpower. Forcing yourself to go workout on a regular basis may increase willpower reserves. Improved diet and sleep habits can also reduce your base stress level and improve your ability to function in critical situations. Think of it this way. If your operational ability is impaired when you reach a 10 on the stress scale, and you walk around in daily life at a 7, it doesn't take very much before your ability to function is reduced. If, however, you reduce your base stress level to a 2, you can handle a lot more before stress begins to reduce your effectiveness.

Habituate to Likely Stressful Events

Being exposed to situations that are similar to real-life events makes them less stressful when actually encountered. This exposure helps prevent some of the brain's alarm systems from firing, and this can dramatically reduce overall stress reaction. The more realistic the training, the better the habituation effects on stress response. Training should simulate, to the maximum extent possible, the situations that you are likely to encounter. This will help keep the C system functioning when critical events are encountered in real life.

Act

For police officers in a violent encounter, freezing is always the wrong response. It leads to a feeling of helplessness. When people feel helpless, their stress levels increase, and this further impairs functioning. Taking action, any action, can help give some sense of control and help reduce stress response. Acting also gives the brain something to do other than focusing on the alarm signals that are being set off.

When the C System Is Compromised

No matter how much willpower you have, how good a shape you are in, or how much you have habituated to particular stressful situations, you will run into situations where your X system overwhelms your C system, at least for short periods of time. You need to prepare for this. Below are a few tips to help function in these situations.

Shift the Emotion

When the X system has overwhelmed the C system, it is easier to overwhelm one X system function with another than it is to restore C system functioning. When experiencing feelings of

panic and fear, it is easier to shift the fear response to anger than it is to restore control. Don't get scared. Get mad at the offender!

Prepare Critical Skills to Function When the C System is Not

One of the great things about the C system is that it can create new motor programs for the X system. The C system is actively engaged when a skill, such as shooting, is first learned. As a shooter, you must think about your grip, the extension of your arms, and the proper alignment of sights. If you practice the shooting action enough (generally at least 3000 times), these reflective activities can become reflexive. The action becomes automatic enough that the C system is no longer needed to govern it. The X system is able to perform the action automatically. Once you train a skill to the point where it is an X system program, it is generally resistant to the negative effects of stress because it does not require C system activity.

Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (The OODA Loop)

In tactical policing, the OODA loop is used as a model to explain how people respond in threatening situations. OODA stands for observe, orient, decide, and act. You must first see (*observe*) what is happening. Next, you must interpret what you are seeing (*orient*). Following orientation, you must determine a course of action (*decide*), and finally, you must perform that action (*act*).

The process is referred to as a loop because each step must be completed in order, and it is often necessary to negotiate the entire process multiple times during an encounter. The OODA loop is a time-competitive cycle. In order to win the encounter, you must negotiate the OODA loop faster than your opponent. You can achieve this by completing the loop faster than the opponent or slowing the opponent's navigation of the loop. The reality is that if you do not practice critical skills, such as shooting, to the point where they become X system programs, you cannot expect to negotiate the OODA loop faster than your opponent. The X system is always faster than the C system. If you have to think about what you are doing, you will be much slower than if you had already programmed yourself with the appropriate reaction. It is also important to note that the X system is not limited to physical actions. It can also be trained to do perceptual work. The X system can be trained to both assess threats and activate a shooting program. In the OODA loop terminology, the entire OODA loop can be trained into the X system.

Use Your C System to Develop Scripts

Finally, you can use your C system when you are not under stress to think about what you should do in a stressful situation. It is possible to think through likely scenarios and the appropriate responses to those scenarios to prepare action scripts. When under stress, you can then access these pre-prepared scripts. While not as fast as performing an action that is programmed into your X system, you can execute these action plans faster than you can develop and execute an unplanned action. The plan that you have thought through beforehand is also likely to be of better quality than the one you come up with on the spot. This is particularly the case when your C system is starting to shut down due to the effects of stress.

Reality-Based Training Safety Briefing

Safety is everyone's responsibility when conducting force-on-force training. The ALERRT program has developed a specific set of safety protocols that must be followed when conducting force-on-force training. It is unacceptable that first responders are constantly being killed or maimed conducting force-on-force training. As a participant, you have the right to question anything that you feel could be a breach of safety protocols.

Each participant and instructor will be searched a minimum of three times (self-check, instructor pat-down, instructor metal detector) prior to entering the semi-safe and safe zones of the training location. These zones will be established by the ALERRT instructor cadre and should be clearly marked. Every precaution will be taken to mark all entry points into the training location; however, it is not uncommon for individuals outside the training event to bypass barriers and enter the training area. If you observe someone from outside the class entering the training location, please notify an instructor immediately. If this occurs while in a scenario, all training must immediately stop.

The following items are not allowed into the training location during force-on-force training:

- Live weapons
- Tasers
- Large, fixed blade knives
- Live ammunition
- Ammunition magazines
- Chemical dispersion devices
- Flash sound diversionary devices
- Impact weapons

Weapons and Protective Equipment and Clothing

1. All weapons used during force-on-force training will be converted to fire only marking cartridges or blank rounds. All blank guns will have the barrel lead filled. No weapons, magazines, or ammunition (marking or blank) will be allowed inside the training area unless first inspected by and approved by the ALERRT instructors.

2. Despite their modifications, the Glock 17Ts provided by the ALERRT instructors are classified by BATF as firearms and the following general safety rules should be followed by all participants:
   a. Treat all weapons as if they are loaded.
   b. Keep your finger off the trigger and outside the trigger guard until you positively identify an imminent threat, and you are ready to engage.
   c. Be aware of your weapon's muzzle at all times. It should not cover anything you are not willing to kill or destroy (the *laser rule*).
   d. Be situationally aware of your arc of fire, from your muzzle to the target and beyond.

3. Weapons
   a. Reload and fix any malfunctions without assistance.
   b. Do not kick or abuse weapon systems.
   c. Participants will be issued two magazines with six rounds in each. Participants should know their weapon status at all times and should practice reloading under stress. This also helps participants focus on situational awareness.

4. ALERRT recommends that participants wear the following protective clothing:
   a. Long sleeve shirt
   b. Long pants
   c. Closed toe shoes or boots

5. In addition, ALERRT recommends that participants wear equipment that they are most likely to have with them when responding to an actual active shooter event. The scenarios

are a great time for the participant to see what works and what does not work in regard to how their equipment is set up. Train the way you expect to fight. These items may include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Ballistic vest
b. Standard duty gear
c. Flashlights

6. ALERRT will provide mandatory safety gear to each participant including head, eye, and throat protection that have been certified to protect against marking cartridges used during training. Groin protection must be provided by the participant.
Participants will determine the appropriate groin protection they will need.

7. Because participants will be asked to role-play, they should not wear distinctive clothing that designates them as an official first responder. It is acceptable for participants to bring additional clothing for placing over distinctive clothing when filling a position as a role player.

Participant Conduct

1. **The Training Safety Officer will control the start and stop of the scenario.** Participants will be required to wear their helmet at all times once the scenario is started. The Training Safety Officer will announce when the helmets can be removed. Participants should remove their helmets only after the Training Safety Officer makes the announcement to do so.

2. **Absolutely no horseplay**. Participants will be treated as professionals during training and professionalism is expected in return. Horseplay will not be tolerated.

3. **No brutalizing role players**. When moving into position to handcuff, use a good *contact cover* technique: communicate, holster weapon, move in, and touch the person you wish to handcuff. The Training Safety Officer will call the subject "handcuffed" and the role player will be restricted in movement as if handcuffed.

4. If you must leave the training area, notify one of the ALERRT instructors. You will need to be rechecked when you return to the training site.

5. Do not discuss the scenarios with anyone outside your immediate contact team.

6. When participants are assigned as role players, follow the exact direction of the Suspect Safety Officer. Do not ad lib.

7. The Training Safety Officer will be wearing a traffic safety vest or bright red shirt. Do not intentionally shoot him or use him as cover during a firefight.

8. Do not train to die. The possibility of first responders being shot and killed is real world and should be rehearsed and trained; however, this is not one of those times. If hit, stay in the fight no matter how many times you get hit. **Do not quit**!

Mishap Procedures

1. Anyone can call a ceasefire.

2. If any of the following occurs during the scenario, a ceasefire should be called:
   a. A participant is seriously injured
   b. A person from outside the class enters the training environment without protective equipment.
   c. Any potential safety hazard arises

3. Actions when ceasefire is called:
   a. Immediately stop action
   b. Pass on the hand and arm signal by waving your hand, fingers extended and palms facing out, in front of your face to other participants
   c. Holster your weapon and stand by for further instructions

Equipment Turn-In

Weapons, magazines, radios, police sash, and chem-lights/strobes will be issued to each contact team while in the staging area. This equipment should be returned after each scenario.

- Collect all equipment before leaving the scenario location.
- When turning in weapons, do not clear and make safe. Participants should take the weapon from their holster or pocket, muzzle pointed down, and either hand it to the TSO or lay it down on the marking cartridge handgun table. Most negligent discharges occur when participants are trying to clear and make safe the weapon.
- Turn in any other equipment (magazine, radio, chem-lights/strobe, etc.).
- Stand-by for your next assignment.

References and Sources

The ALERRT Center at Texas State University has been recognized by the FBI as the National Standard in Active Shooter Response Training since 2013. Portions of this manual and course are adapted from previously published ALERRT work, ALERRT-led research, and prior ALERRT courses. In some cases, older references were used as part of the original course and manual development, and these remain foundational to the current material. All subsequent revisions have been carried out by ALERRT staff and employees who are subject matter experts on the topics addressed in the course objectives. Updates draw upon ALERRT research, beta-course development and testing, and feedback from ALERRT students and adjunct instructors. Each course undergoes a year-long process of revision and redevelopment prior to publication, with all content created, reviewed, and approved by ALERRT staff and employees. Unless otherwise noted by a direct citation to an external source, all material in this manual should be considered as originating with ALERRT and treated as a self-citation to ALERRT without requiring a year of publication.

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Glossary of Acronyms Used

CAT – Combat Application Tourniquet

CCP – Casualty Collection Point

CRASE – Civilian Response to Active Shooter Events

CRCC – Civilian Response and Casualty Care

EM – Emergency Management

EMS – Emergency Medical Services

FD – Fire Department

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

IC – Incident Command

ICS – Incident Command System

ITC – Indirect Threat Care

LCAN – Location, Condition, Actions, Needs

LE – Law Enforcement

MARCH – Massive bleeding, Airway, Respirations, Circulation, Hypothermia

POD – Point of Domination

RTF – Rescue Task Force

SIM – Security, Incident Command, Medical

SOFT-T – Special Operations Forces Tactical Tourniquet

SOFT-TW – Special Operations Forces Tactical Tourniquet, Wide

SWAT – Special Weapons and Tactics

TECC – Tactical Emergency Casualty Care

TCCC – Tactical Combat Casualty Care

XP – Exchange Point

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